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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of credit risk assessment under changing conditions in 
financial environments. There are a number of serious challenges in this area that have 
not received sufficient attention so far. This includes adapting the rating systems to 
population drifts and stress-testing decision systems under extreme adverse conditions.  
Research evolves from a baseline methodology to new dynamic modelling frameworks, 
and is settled in two interconnected research domains: the first assumes that the rating 
systems’ frameworks should adapt to the changing conditions; the second deals with the 
influence of extreme circumstances in credit default and in the banking business. As part 
of our contributions, we propose new methodological frameworks for risk assessment, 
and we present renewed empirical measures for credit risk. Empirical studies use real-
world financial databases, of which the most relevant is the Freddie Mac’s loan-level 
dataset, available online since 2013 in the follow-up to the subprime crisis in the United 
States (U.S.).  
In the first research domain we propose an adaptive modelling framework to investigate 
the two mechanisms of memory, short-term (STM) and long-term memory (LTM), in 
credit risk assessment. These components are fundamental to learning, but have been 
overlooked in credit risk modelling frameworks. We argue that different memory 
windows can be explored concurrently. This is important in the credit risk area, which 
often undergo shocks. During a shock, limited memory is important; at other times, a 
larger memory may be preferred.  
In the second domain, we have developed a stress-testing methodology under the 
international rules on capital requirements, the Basel Accords. We present the first study 
using Freddie Mac database, which describes and implements a risk-adjusted equity 
model to fund the loans lending. In this context, we analyze the impact of the probability 
of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) in the return on lending, when subject to the 
most extreme adverse circumstances of the past. We contribute with a more realistic 
understanding of the behavior of the reference static models when exposed to major 
disturbances in the financial systems.  
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Resumo 
 
Esta tese aborda o problema da alteração das condições nos ambientes financeiros para 
avaliação de risco de crédito. Há vários desafios importantes nesta área que ainda não 
receberam reflexão suficiente, tais como a adaptação dos sistemas de rating na presença 
de drifts e a compreensão do impacto de condições extremas nos sistemas de decisão. 
A investigação evolui a partir de uma primeira metodologia de base para novas estruturas 
de modelagem dinâmicas. O trabalho desenvolveu-se em dois domínios de investigação 
interligados: o primeiro assume que os quadros dos sistemas de rating devem adaptar-se 
às condições em cada momento; o segundo trata da influência das circunstâncias adversas 
extremas no incumprimento do crédito e no negócio bancário. Como parte das nossas 
contribuições, propomos novos quadros metodológicos na avaliação do risco e 
apresentamos medidas empíricas renovadas para o risco de crédito. Os estudos de caso 
utilizam bases de dados financeiros reais, das quais a mais relevante é a base de dados da 
Freddie Mac. Esta tem vindo a ser disponibilizada online desde 2013 no seguimento da 
crise do subprime nos Estados Unidos (EU). 
No primeiro domínio da investigação, propomos uma framework de modelagem 
adaptativa para compreender os dois mecanismos de memória, de curto e de longo prazo, 
na avaliação de risco de crédito. Estas componentes são fundamentais para a 
aprendizagem, mas têm sido negligenciadas nos quadros de modelização atuais. 
Defendemos que janelas de memória diferentes podem ser exploradas simultaneamente, 
o que é importante na área do risco de crédito, frequentemente sujeita a choques. Nas 
crises, a memória curta é importante; em fases estáveis, é desejável uma memória longa.  
No segundo domínio da investigação, desenvolvemos uma metodologia de testes de 
esforço ao abrigo das regras internacionais sobre os requisitos de capital. Apresentamos 
o primeiro estudo suportado na base de dados da Freddie Mac, que descreve e implementa 
um modelo de retorno dos empréstimos ajustado pelo risco dos ativos alocados a essas 
operações. Neste contexto, analisamos o impacto da probabilidade de incumprimento 
(PD) e da perda dado o incumprimento (LGD) no retorno dos empréstimos, quando 
sujeitos às circunstâncias adversas mais extremas do passado. Contribuímos assim para 
uma compreensão mais realista sobre o comportamento dos modelos estáticos de 
referência quando sujeitos a perturbações nos sistemas financeiros.  
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1. Introduction 
 
More than half a century has passed since credit scoring models were 
introduced to credit risk assessment and corporate bankruptcy prediction 
(Harold Bierman and Hausman, 1970, Altman, 1968, Smith, 1964, Myers and 
Forgy, 1963). Nowadays, in advanced economies, a high proportion of loans 
are automatically decided using frameworks where the credit score is the 
central, if not the unique, indicator of the borrowers’ credit risk. In the United 
States (US) the measure of risk FICO score is an industry standard, claimed 
to be used in 90% of lending decisions, to determine how much capital each 
individual can borrow and to set the interest rate for each loan. In the OECD 
countries, probability of default models, or PD models, are the cornerstone 
for the calculation of banks’ regulatory capital in the internal ratings-based 
(IRB) approach of the Basel revised Framework. For the retail exposures, the 
determination of the borrower’s PD, which in association with the loss given 
default (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD), form the key input risk 
parameters for the minimum capital calculation.  
A credit scoring model is an intelligent system. The output is a prediction of 
a borrower falling into default in the future. Typical credit scoring models are 
developed from static datasets. Subject to context specifics, and provided that 
certain requirements of the methods are met, a timeframe for the development 
is delimited somewhere in the past. Then, by looking at historical examples 
within such timeframe, the model is designed using a supervised learning 
approach. The resulting model is then used, possibly for several years, 
without further adjustments. As a result, these models are quite insensitive to 
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changes in the financial environments, such as population drifts in periods of 
major financial distress.  
Our research has a three-fold objective. First, we attempt to introduce time 
changing economics and market conditions into credit scoring models. 
Second, we aim to outline a new and a more realistic modelling framework 
capable of self-adjusting and learning adaptively from the dynamics that 
distress or change consumers’ behaviour and their credit worthiness. The 
third objective is to evaluate the impact of extreme events on credit risk 
measures, and therefore in banks’ lending outcomes, under the current capital 
rules. 
We study and propose new dynamic modelling frameworks for credit risk 
assessment. Research is settled in two connected lines: the first assumes that 
rating systems should adapt to the evolving landscapes; the second deals with 
the influence of default rates’ fluctuations on banking business.  
In our research we start by documenting the underlying problem by focusing 
on the analysis of an extensive database that is the main driver of the ensuing 
study on dynamic models, the Freddie Mac’s single loan-level dataset, first 
published in March 2013. We investigate the dynamics and performance of 
over 16.7 million of fully amortized, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in the US, 
granted between 1999 and the first quarter of 2013. In this investigation, we 
identify the frailties of the frameworks used in default prediction, to identify 
the implications to risk-based pricing and rating systems designs. Our 
analysis shows that, not only scores diminished their ability to predict defaults 
when the mortgage crisis had come to public’s attention, but also the real 
default rates by score are quite irregular over time. We therefore conclude 
that there is a link between scores, lending and default, mostly influenced by 
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the lending practices, although the mapping between these is not adequate. 
Existing credit scoring models are effective to sort individuals by risk, but 
they are not suitable to predict real default in each point in time (Sousa et al., 
2015a).  
In light of the above, the core of our research focuses on investigating and 
developing an initial approach for dynamic credit scoring modelling, suitable 
to deal with the temporal degradation of static credit scoring models (Sousa 
et al., 2013). The model is firstly developed with a classical framework using 
a static supervised learning and a binary output. Then, using a linear 
regression between the macroeconomic data and the internal default in the 
portfolio, the output is adjusted by macroeconomic factors. This methodology 
jointly deals with the specific risk, which is captured from the data gathered 
by the time of the application, and the systemic risk, which is modelled with 
the regression. When applied to a portfolio of customers with credit cards, in 
a financial institution operating in Brazil, it produced motivating results over 
a one-year period. Subsequently, we extend this line of investigation by 
proposing a new dynamic modelling framework for credit risk assessment. 
The proposed model mimics the principle of films, in that it composes the 
credit scoring with a sequence of snapshots, rather than a single photograph. 
Within the new modelling scheme, predictions are made upon the sequence 
of temporal data, which is suitable for adapting to real default concept drifts, 
translated by changes in the population, in the economy or in the market. The 
new model enabled us to depict the two basic mechanisms of memory - short-
term (STM) and long-term memory (LTM) - in credit risk assessment. Central 
to this line of investigation is the idea that models can be improved when 
acting similarly to human learning and that STM and LTM are the driving 
components of that process. 
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The first line of our research argues that the credit risk assessment should 
evolve with the changes in the conditions underlying the models. However, 
when rating systems do not have such an ability, as those which prevail in the 
industry, banks’ lending policies and supervisory rules should be oriented by 
realistic evaluations of the financial business models. With this motivation, 
we developed a research pipeline, consisting of a stress-testing methodology, 
which is an important risk management tool used by banks and supervisors.  
In the second domain of our research, we present a first application of Freddie 
Mac’s database to stress-testing. Here, we propose a first implementation of 
a return on risk-adjusted equity model embedded in the contemporary capital 
regulatory framework, which can easily be replicated to other real-loans 
portfolios. Our research is pioneer in relating the FICO credit score, which 
from 1990 is the key driver of lending decision-making in the US, with the 
return on lending, through the last financial crisis. We found that much of the 
disturbances on the return on lending occur when the Loss Given Default 
(LGD) is sufficiently high. Below LGD=25%, empirical simulations show 
that lending to borrowers with lower scores produces positive returns in the 
long-run. Therefore, we claim that, for certain values of LGD, credit-cuts by 
score might have been an overreaction to the crisis. If sufficiently mature, 
these loans can boost portfolios compositions, because they are less exposed 
to early payments.  
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1.1. Contributions 
 
The main contribution of this research is a new modelling framework for 
credit risk assessment that extends beyond the prevailing credit scoring 
models built upon historical data static settings. The proposed modelling 
scheme is able to adapt more suitably to changes in the financial 
environments, like population drifts and shocks in the economy or in the 
markets. 
Our theoretical model is supported by empirical evidence. When the new 
modelling framework is applied to a set of 16.7 million mortgage loans 
granted in the U.S. from 1999 through 2013, it becomes apparent that new 
data consistently improves forecasting accuracy. We claim that existing 
models are improved when acting similarly to human learning, in which the 
STM and LTM are key mechanisms of cognition. 
While the previous line of investigation provides convincing results, there are 
some real business problems with adjusting models over time. First, lenders 
have little incentive to employ such models, because it is expensive and time-
consuming to build new scorecards. Models need to be internally tested and 
validated and then regulators need to approve them. Furthermore, regulators 
still promote models whose coefficients do not change over time.  
In this scenario, stress-testing methods are another important risk 
management tool used by banks and supervisors to measure the impact of 
some disorderly events on real systems (like financial crashes), although 
banks are still using unchanged models. We present a first application of 
Freddie Mac’s database to stress-testing, which can easily be replicated to 
other real-loans portfolios. Our proposal includes a first implementation of a 
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return on risk-adjusted equity model embedded in the contemporary capital 
regulatory framework. Under this setting, we analyse the impact of the 
Probability of Default and the Loss Given Default (LGD) in the return on 
lending under the most extreme adverse circumstances of the past. We find 
that under certain values of LGD, lending to lower scored borrowers can 
produce positive returns in the long run. When sufficient mature, these loans 
can improve portfolios composition because they are less exposed to early 
repayments.  
 
1.2. Publications and awards 
 
Parts of the second appear in the paper “A new dynamic modeling framework 
for credit risk assessment”, which is published in the Journal of Expert 
Systems with Applications1. 
The material in chapter 3 is published, on the whole, as a regular paper in the 
Journal of Economics, Business and Management2 with the title “Links 
between Scores, Real Default and Pricing: Evidence from the Freddie Mac’s 
Loan-level Dataset”.   
Chapter 4 describes a first methodology for dynamic modelling which was 
used in the model that won3 a competition in the area of data mining and 
                                                          
1 ISSN: 0957-4174; DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.09.055. According to the ISI Thomson 
Reuters Journal Citation Report 2015, the journal impact factor was 2,24 in 2014, being in 
the first quartile in three research areas: Operations Research & Management Science 
(12/81), Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence (29/123) and Engineering, Electrical & 
Electronic (48/249). 
2JOEBM 2015 Vol.3(12): 1106-1114 ISSN: 2301-3567; 
DOI:10.7763/JOEBM.2015.V3.343. 
3http://www.inesctec.pt/ip-en/news-events/news/liaad-inesc-tec-conquista-1o-lugar-em-
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finance, promoted by the conference BRICS4 Countries Congress (BRICS-
CCI) on Computational Intelligence, in 2013. It was published in the 
proceedings of the conference with the title “A two-stage model for dealing 
with temporal degradation of credit scoring”5. A related version is published 
as a FEP working paper6 with the title “Introducing time-changing economics 
into Credit Scoring”.  
Chapter 5 is a large extension of the work presented in Chapter 4. Our paper 
“A new dynamic modeling framework for credit risk assessment” presents 
the methodology, and is published in the Journal of Expert Systems with 
Applications7. Another paper describing an application of this method stands 
on the Freddie Mac’s loans database and was submitted to the Journal of Risk 
Model Validation with the title “Dynamic credit score modelling with short-
term and long-term memories: the case of Freddie Mac’s database”, and is 
being revised taking in consideration the reviewers’ comments. 
The content of chapter 6 was presented in the paper entitled “Stress-testing 
the return on lending under real extreme adverse circumstances” at the EFMA 
meetings 2015. Taking into consideration the comments received, the paper 
was submitted with minor changes to the Journal of Credit Risk, with the title 
“Stress-testing the return on lending in the aftermath of the crisis under the 
Basel Capital Rules”, where it is under review. 
 
                                                          
competicao-de-financas-e-data-mining/. 
4BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa.   
5 arXiv:1406.7775. 
6 ISSN: 0870-8541; working paper n. 513. 
7 ISSN: 0957-4174; DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.09.055. 
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Structure of the dissertation 
 
The remainder of this document is organized in six chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides some relevant technical background, which includes the 
state-of-the-art and base concepts in credit risk modelling.  
Chapter 3 outlines the real financial problem motivating our research. 
Complementing the previous works, we provide a fine-graded time-analysis 
over scores and analyse in which conditions risk-based pricing and credit 
decision-making had been implemented. We document the dynamics and 
performance of over 16.7 million mortgage loans that were at the epicentre of 
the last global crisis, to find that credit scoring models are effective to sort 
individuals by risk, but they are unsuccessful in predicting real default to each 
point in time.  
Chapter 4 describes a first approach to dynamic credit scoring modelling, 
designed to adapt predictions to each point in time. We propose a 
methodology that jointly deals with the specific risk and the systemic risk, 
assumed to be time-variant. Firstly, we develop a model with a static 
supervised learning model and then we adjust the output by a set of public 
macroeconomic factors.  
In chapter 5 we add more depth to the credit score learning. We present an 
empirical study relying on the Freddie Mac’s database where we apply a new 
dynamic modelling framework for credit risk assessment. In this study we 
employ two learning configurations of memory, short-term memory (STM) 
and long-term memory (LTM), to argue that current rating frameworks can 
be optimized with a dynamic modelling with concurrent STM and LTM. 
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Chapter 6 describes a first implementation of a return on risk-adjusted equity 
model under the current capital requirements. The empirical study relying on 
the Freddie Mac’s database assumes the view of an Advanced bank, under 
the Basel III rules and considering two risk-weighting approaches, as in the 
U.S. banks and as in the European Union. 
Thesis conclusions and paths for future work are discussed in chapter 7.  
Some sections are repeated through the chapters of the dissertation to make 
them self-contained.
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2. State-of-the-art and base concepts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parts of this chapter are published in the Journal of Expert Systems with Applications in the 
paper titled “A new dynamic modeling framework for credit risk assessment”. ISSN: 0957-
4174; DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.09.055.  
Some sections are repeated through the dissertation to make the chapters self-contained. 
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2.1. Credit scoring - from Fisher’s discriminant to machine 
learning 
 
The World War II promoted the first expert systems to evaluate a person’s 
credit worthiness. As credit analysts were called to fight, finance houses and 
mail-order firms requested them to write down their rules for deciding whom 
to give loans. Some of these were numerical scoring systems and others were 
sets of conditions that needed to be satisfied – expert systems. In the early 
1950, Bill Fair and Earl Isaac created the first consultancy directed to finance 
houses, retailers and mail orders firms, making use of statistically derived 
models in lending decision. Still, until 1970 credit risk assessment relied most 
exclusively in human judgement. Connected with lending activities, this task 
was typically performed to support decision-making, following a specific 
credit application. The labour of the risk evaluator, often a branch manager, 
would involve the analysis of the likelihood of a customer repaying his debt, 
based on a number of clues that he could gather from a community leader or 
an external entity, such as the employer, a credit bureau or another lender. 
Main aspects that he would check would concern to the customer character 
and honesty and his ability to create wealth. A person with little or no history 
of credit, or without proven capacity to gather assets would have little or no 
chance of having credit. The depth of reasoning behind a decision could 
largely vary and final decision would much depend on the evaluator's mood 
and instinct. From customer application to the decision or credit granting, the 
process was usually slow (Thomas et al., 2002). 
The first approach to differentiate between groups took place in Fisher’s 
original work (1936) for general classification problems of varieties of plants. 
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The objective was to find the best separation between two groups, searching 
for the best combination of variables such that the groups were separated the 
most in the subspace. Durand (1941) brought this methodology to finance for 
distinguishing between good and bad consumer loans. The first method used 
in the development of credit scoring systems was discriminant analysis, 
mainly focused on credit granting in two categories of loans: consumer loans, 
and commercial loans. For an early review and critique on the use of 
discriminant analysis in credit scoring, see Eisenbeis (1978). 
The boom of credit cards demanded the automation of the credit decision task 
and the use of better credit scoring systems, which were doable due to the 
growth of computing power. The value of credit scoring became noticed and 
it was recognized as a much better predictor than any other judgmental 
scheme. Logistic regression (Steenackers and Goovaerts, 1989) and linear 
programming (see Chen et al. (2013) for a review) were introduced in credit 
scoring, and they turned out to be the most used in financial industry 
(Anderson, 2007, Crook et al., 2007). The use of artificial intelligence 
techniques imported from statistical learning theory, such as classification 
trees (Breiman et al., 1984, Quinlan, 1986) and neural networks (Malhotra 
and Malhotra, 2002, West, 2000, Desai et al., 1996, Jensen, 1992) have arisen 
in credit scoring systems. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is another method 
based in optimization and statistical learning that received increased attention 
over the last decade in research in finance, either to build credit scoring 
systems for consumer finance or to predict bankruptcy (Min and Lee, 2005, 
Li et al., 2006). Genetic algorithms (Chen and Huang, 2003), colony 
optimization (Martens et al., 2007), and regression and multivariate adaptive 
regression splines (Lee and Chen, 2005) have also been tried. 
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The choice of a learning algorithm is a difficult problem and it is often based 
on which happen to be available, or best known, to the user. The number of 
learning algorithms is vast. Many frameworks, adaptations to real-life 
problems, intertwining of base algorithms were, and continue to be, proposed 
in the literature, ranging from statistical approaches to state-of-the-art 
machine learning algorithms, parametric to non-parametric procedures. 
Lessmann et al. (2015) compare several novel classification algorithms to the 
state-of-the-art in credit scoring and provide an assessment of recent scoring 
methods that sets a new baseline to which future approaches can be compared. 
Practice actually suggests that rational behind choice is likely to be more 
shifted to palatability rather than to accuracy, translated by any performance 
measure (such as error rate, Receiver Operating Characteristic curve, Gini 
index, or other).  
As an alternative to using a single method, a trend that is still evolving relates 
to the use of hybrid systems (Lee et al., 2002), and ensemble of classifiers 
with which the outputs are achieved by a predefined sequence or rule, or a 
voting scheme. New concepts for adapting to changes (Adams et al., 2010, 
Pavlidis et al., 2012, Yang, 2007, Jung et al., 2015) and modelling the 
dynamics (Crook and Bellotti, 2010) in populations start being exploited in 
credit risk assessment.   
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2.2. Base concepts and techniques 
 
2.2.1. Score formulation 
 
A credit scoring model is a simplification of the reality. The output is a 
prediction of a given entity, actual or potential borrower, entering in default 
in a given future period. Having decided on the default concept, 
conventionally a borrower being in arrears for more than 90 days in the 
following 12 months, those cases matching the criterion are considered bad 
and the others are good. Other approaches may consider a third status, the 
indeterminate, between the good and the bad classes, e.g. 15 to 90 days 
overdue, for which it may be unclear whether the borrower should be assigned 
to one class or to the other. This status is usually removed from the modelling 
sample; still the model can be used to score them.  
Applied to credit risk assessment, we are essentially considering a supervised 
learning problem with the aim of predicting the default y ∈ {good, bad}, 
given a set of input characteristics 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗. The term example, or record, is used 
to refer to one pair of (x, y). Supervised learning classification methods try to 
determine a function that best separates the individuals in each of the classes, 
good and bad, in the space of the problem. A robust model enables an 
appropriate differentiation between the good and the bad classes. It is 
achieved by capturing an adequate set of information for predicting the 
probability of the default concept (i.e. belonging to the bad class), based on 
previous known default occurrences. 
The model building is carried on a set of examples – training set – collected 
from the past history of credit, for which both x and y are known. The best 
separation function can be achieved with a classification method. These 
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methods include, among others, well-known classification algorithms such as 
decision trees (DT), SVMs, artificial neural networks (ANN), and 
Generalized Additive Models (GAM). Hands-on software packages are 
available to the user for example in R, SAS, Matlab, and Model Builder for 
Predictive Analytics. The accuracy of such functions is typically assessed in 
separate sets of known examples – test, validation or out-of-sample datasets. 
The idea is to anticipate the accuracy of that function in future predictions of 
new examples where x is known, but y is not. 
The output of these models is a function of the input characteristics x, which 
is most commonly referred as score, 𝑠(𝐱). This function has a monotonic 
decreasing relationship with the probability of entering in default (i.e. 
reaching the bad status). The notation of such probability is 
        𝑝(𝐵|𝑠(𝐱)) = 𝑝(𝐵|𝑠(𝐱)) = 𝑝(𝐵|𝑠(𝐱), 𝐱) = 𝑝(𝐵|𝐱), ∀𝐱 ∈ 𝐗, (1)  
where B represents the bad class, or in other words 𝑝(𝐵) = 𝑝(𝑦 = bad). 
Likewise, G represents the good class and 𝑝(𝐺) = 𝑝(𝑦 = good). 
Since 𝑝(𝐺|𝑥) + 𝑝(𝐵|𝑥) = 1, the probability of the complementary class 
comes as 
𝑝(𝐺|𝑠(𝐱)) = 𝑃(𝐺|𝐱) = 1 − 𝑝(𝐵|𝐱), ∀𝐱 ∈ 𝐗. (2)  
Among researchers and practitioners, a usual form of the score is the log odds 
score 
𝑠(𝐱) = ln
𝑝(𝐺|𝐱)
𝑝(𝐵|𝐱)
  and 𝑝(𝐵|𝐱) + 𝑝(𝐺|𝐱) = 𝟏 (3)  
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And so, the score may vary from -∞, when 𝑝(𝐺|𝐱) = 0, to +∞, when 
𝑝(𝐺|𝐱) = 1, i.e 𝑠(𝐱) ∈        . In this case, the probability of the default event 
can be written in terms of the score as 
𝑝(𝐵|𝐱) =
1
1+𝑒𝒔(𝐱)
 , ∀𝐱 ∈ 𝐗. (4)  
The most conventional way to produce log odds score is based in the logistic 
regression. However, other classification algorithms can also be used, 
adjusting the output to the scale of that function. Although a grounded 
mathematical treatment may be tempting to tackle this problem, it goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The basics of credit scoring and the most 
common approaches to build a credit scoring model are further detailed in the 
operational research literature (Thomas et al., 2002, Anderson, 2007). Recent 
advances in the area deliver methods to build risk-based pricing models and 
methodologies towards the optimization of the profitability to the lenders 
(Einav et al., 2013). 
In the following sections, we will describe some of the most widely used 
techniques in credit scoring development, being the Generalized Additive 
Models (GAM) the core method of our research. 
 
2.2.2. Generalized linear models 
 
Linear regression models represent the linear relationship between a 
continuous response variable and one or more predictor variables (either 
continuous or categorical) in the form 𝐲 = 𝐱𝐰 + 𝛆, where 𝐲 is the vector of 
observations of the response variable, 𝑋 is the matrix determined by the 
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predictors, 𝒘 is the vector of parameters, 𝜺 is a vector of random disturbances, 
independent of each other and usually having a normal distribution. These 
models are appropriated for linear relationships between the response and one 
or more predictors. The 𝑋 matrix (and the 𝐰 vector) is usually extended with 
an additional variable, with all data points taking the same constant value on 
this variable. This allows obtaining linear relationships without the restriction 
of passing through the origin. The hypothesis of normally distributed 
regression errors is very restrictive. Generalized linear models (GLM), 
formulated by Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) are an extension of linear 
regression models, expanding the use of regression analysis beyond 
disturbances with normal distribution, which can be used when in the 
presence of nonlinear relationships.  
To understand GLM, first notice that the linear models have the following 
three characteristics: 
- The response has a normal distribution with mean . 
- A coefficient vector 𝐰 defines a linear combination 𝐱T𝐰 of the 
predictors 𝐱. 
- The model equates the two as 𝜇 = 𝐱𝐰. 
In GLM, these characteristics are generalized as follows:  
- The response has a distribution that can be normal, binomial, Poisson, 
gamma, or inverse Gaussian. 
- A coefficient vector 𝐰 defines a linear combination 𝐱𝐰 of the 
predictors 𝐱. 
- A link function 𝑓() defines the link between the two as 𝑓(𝜇) = 𝐱. 
The most important case in which linearity is not enough is when y and  are 
bounded. The linear model is inadequate in these cases because complicated 
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and unnatural constraints on w would be required to make sure that stays 
within range. Typically, the link function is used to transform the  into a 
scale on which it is unconstrained. The identity link specifies that the 
expected mean of the response variable is identical to the linear predictor, 
rather than to a non-linear function of the linear predictor. Although other link 
functions are possible (e.g. probit and the complementary log-log function), 
some common canonical link functions for a variety of probability 
distribution are given below in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Typical settings in GLMs. 
Probability 
distribution 
Canonical link 
Function 
Meaning 𝒇() 
Parameter 
restriction 
Normal Identity 𝑓(𝜇) = 𝜇 𝜇 real 
Binomial Logit f(𝜇) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜇
1−𝜇
) 𝜇 ∈ (0,1) 
Poisson Log 𝑓(𝜇) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜇) 𝜇 > 0 
Gamma Reciprocal f(𝜇) = 1/𝜇 𝜇 > 0 
 
 
2.2.3. Logistic Regression 
 
Logistic regression is an instance of the generalized linear models. It is similar 
to a linear regression model but it is suited to models where the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, that is, the dependent variable can take the value 1 
with probability q or the value 0 with probability 1-q. This type of variable is 
called a Bernoulli (or binary) variable.  
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The independent or predictor variables in logistic regression can take any 
form. That is, logistic regression makes no assumption about the distribution 
of the independent variables. They do not have to be normally distributed, 
linearly related or of equal variance within each group. The relationship 
between the predictor and the response variables is not linear; instead, the 
logit link function is used: 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝜇
1−𝜇
= 𝐰T𝐱. Or, stated equivalently, 𝜇 =
𝑒𝐰
T𝐱
1+𝑒𝐰
T𝐱
.
 
Fitting a logistic classifier model implies finding estimates of w that 
maximize the likelihood of the model (that is, the probability of the data given 
the model). It can be shown that this model is optimal when both the class-
conditional densities 𝑝(𝐱|𝐺) and 𝑝(𝐱|𝐵) are multi-normal with equal 
covariance matrices, where 𝐺 and 𝐵 represent the two target classes. The 
hyper-plane of all points 𝐱 satisfying the equation 𝐰T𝐱 = 0 forms the 
decision boundary between the two classes; these are the points for which 
𝑝(𝐺|𝐱, 𝐰) =  𝑝(𝐵|𝐱, 𝐰) = 0.5. 
 
2.2.4. Generalized additive models 
 
Generalized additive models (GAM) are an extension on GLM, introduced 
by Hastie and Tibshrirani (1986). GAM is often integrated in commercial 
analytical tools that are used in scorecard designs (FICO, 2006).  GAM is a 
family of powerful and palatable predictive modelling with a wide 
applicability range, suitable for business applications like credit scoring. It 
has been documented as a good solution to fulfill the gap between parametric 
and non-parametric predictive modelling, providing a good trade-off between 
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interpretability and predictive power (Silva and Cardoso, 2015). GAM 
generalizes the GLM procedure by replacing the linear predictor with a more 
general version 𝑠0 + ∑ 𝑠𝑗(𝑥𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 , where 𝑠𝑗(. ) are smooth functions 
standardized to verify 𝐸 (𝑠𝑗(𝑥𝑗)) = 0 for 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑝 and 𝑝 representing the 
number of predictors. The 𝑠𝑗(. ) function can be specified parametrically or 
not. 
 
2.3. Critiques to the existing approaches and new challenges 
 
A few limitations to the existing approaches, idealized in the classical 
supervised classification paradigm, can be traced in published literature 
(Crook et al., 1992, Gama et al., 2014, Hand, 2006, Lucas, 2004, Thomas, 
2010, Yang, 2007): 
 The static models usually fail to adapt when population changes. 
 Static and predefined sample settings often lead to an incomplete 
examination of the dynamics influencing the problem. 
 Certain assumptions that are implicit to the methods, often fail in real-
world environments. These assumptions regard to: 
- Representativeness – the standard credit scoring models rely on 
supervised classification methods that run on 2-years-old static 
samples, in order to determine which individuals are likely to 
default in a future fixed period, 1 year for PD models. Such samples 
are supposed to be representative of the potential credit consumers 
of the future, the through-the-door population, and sufficiently 
diverse to reflect different types of repayment behaviour and to 
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allow identifying which characteristics best explain differences 
between individuals that enter in default from those who not. 
However, a wide range of research is conducted in small samples 
that are easily available in public literature. 
- Stability and non-bias – the underlying distributions of the training 
and test sets are the same; classes are perfectly defined, and 
definitions will not change. Not infrequently there are selective 
biases over time. Simple examples of this occurrence can be 
observed when a bank launches a new product or promotes a brand 
new segment of customers, or when macroeconomics shifts 
abruptly from an expansion to a recession phase. 
- Misclassification costs – these methods assume that the costs of 
misclassification are accurately known, but in practice they are not. 
 The methods that are most widely used in the banking industry, 
logistic regression and discriminant analysis, are associated with some 
instability with high-dimensional data and small sample size, 
intensive variable selection effort and incapability of efficiently 
handling non-linear features. 
Part of the criticism to the existing research is focused in a large number of 
studies that attempt to establish the relative superiority of classification 
methods (Hand, 2006). In fact, specific features of the problem often render 
differences irrelevant or unreal when models are applied in practice, and 
reported gains resulting from in-lab experiments do not, in many cases, 
translate into real superiority. Likewise, it is not clear whether existing studies 
and real-world applications follow basic principles of machine learning. 
Rather than exhaustively trying to find criteria with which an algorithm 
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outperforms another, by some decimals, research should refocus on the 
problems to capture their essence (Hand, 2006, Thomas, 2010). On the other 
hand, regulation urges new approaches for suitably dealing with cyclicality, 
providing incentives for banks to better manage risk and returns over the long-
run. 
So far, no comprehensive set of research to this end had much impact into 
practice. In what concerns to credit risk in retail finance, a great deal of 
sophistication that is needed regards to the introduction of economic factors 
and market conditions into current risk-assessment systems (Thomas, 2010, 
Sousa et al., 2013).  
Dominant approaches usually stand on static learning models. However, as 
the economic conditions evolve in the economic cycle (either deteriorating or 
improving), also varies the behaviour of an individual, and his ability of 
repaying his debt, hence, default needs to be regarded as time changing. Also 
the default evolution echoes trends of the business cycle, and related with this, 
regulatory movements, and interest rates fluctuations. In good times, banks 
and borrowers tend to be overoptimistic about the future, whilst in times of 
recession banks are swamped with defaulted loans, high provisions, and 
tightened capital buffers. The former lead to more liberal credit policies and 
lower credit standards, the latter promote sudden credit-cuts. Empirical 
evidence and theoretical frameworks support a positive, and lagged 
relationship between rapid credit growth and loan losses (Sousa et al., 2015a).  
Traditional systems that are one-shot, fixed memory-based, trained from 
fixed training sets, and static models are not prepared to process the highly 
detailed evolving data. And so, they are not able to continuously maintain an 
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output model consistent with the actual state of nature, or to quickly react to 
changes. These are some of the features of classic approaches that put 
evidence on that the existing credit scoring systems are limited. As the 
processes underlying credit risk are not strictly stationary, consumers’ 
behaviour and default can change over time in unpredictable ways. There are 
several types of evolution inside a population, like population drift that 
translate into changes in the distributions of the variables or their ability to 
discriminate between default and non-defaulter individuals, affecting credit 
scoring performance. There is a new emphasis on running predictive models 
with the ability of sensing themselves and learning adaptively. Advances on 
the concepts for knowledge discovery from data streams suggest alternative 
perspectives to identify, understand and efficiently manage dynamics of 
behaviour in consumer credit in changing ubiquitous environments. In a 
world in which events are not preordained and little is certain, what we do in 
the present affect how events unfold in unexpected ways. The new paradigm 
of forecasting turns out to be looking at hidden streams in the present signal 
and understand how they will possibly direct an event into the future. 
 
2.4. Dynamic modelling for credit default 
2.4.1. Concept drift in credit default 
 
Credit default is mostly a consequence of financial distress. A person, or a 
company, is in financial distress when experiencing individual financial 
constraints or being exposed to external disturbances. Financial constraints in 
private individuals may result from abrupt or intrinsic circumstances. In the 
first case, distress is usually an outcome of sorrowful events like 
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unemployment, pay cuts, divorce, and disease. The second is most commonly 
related to overexposure, low assets, erratic behaviour, or bad management 
performance. In this paper we tackle the phenomenon of concept drift in 
credit default, which we now briefly explain.  
In the existing literature, concept drift is generally used to describe changes 
in the target concept, which are activated by transformations in the hidden 
context (Widmer and Kubat, 1996, Schlimmer and Granger Jr, 1986) in 
dynamically changing and non-stationary environments. As a result of these 
transformations, the target concept can shift suddenly or just cause a change 
in the underlying data distribution to the model. This means that with time, 
optimal features may drift significantly from their original configuration or 
simply lose their ability to explain the target concept. For example, a 
reduction of the minimum LTV (loan to value) tightens the space of possible 
values, which is noticed with a change in the distribution, and eventually in 
the credit default concept. When such drifts happen, the robustness of the 
model may significantly decrease, and in some situations it may no longer be 
acceptable. Some authors distinguish real concept drift from virtual drift 
(Gama et al., 2014, Sun and Li, 2011, Tsymbal, 2004). The former refers to 
changes in the conditional distribution of the output (i.e., target variable) 
given the input features, while the distribution of the input may remain 
unchanged. The later refers to gradual changes in the underlying data 
distribution with new sample data flowing, whereas the target concept does 
not change (Sun and Li, 2011). Real concept drift refers to changes in p(y|x), 
and it happens when the target concept of credit default evolves in time. Such 
changes can occur either with or without a change in p(x). This type of drift 
may happen directly as a result of new rules for defining the target classes, 
good or bad, as those settled by regulators, when new criteria for default are 
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demanded to the banks. Examples of these include the guidelines for the 
minimum number of days past due or in the materiality threshold for the 
amount of credit in arrears, issued with the previous Basel II Accord. Another 
understanding of the real concept drift in credit default is associated with 
indirect changes in the hidden context. In this case, credit default changes 
when evolving from one stage of delinquency to another. For example, most 
of the people with credit until five days past due tend to pay before the 
following instalment, as most of them are just delayers or forgetters. Yet, the 
part of debtors in arrears that also fail the next instalment are most likely to 
be in financial distress, possibly as a result of an abrupt or intrinsic 
circumstance, and therefore they require more care from the bank. When 
arrears exceed three instalments, the debtor is most certainly with serious 
financial constraints, and is likely to fail his credit obligations. More extreme 
delays commonly translate into hard stages of credit default, which require 
intensive tracking labour or legal actions. Virtual drifts happen when there 
are changes in the distribution of the new sample data flowing without 
affecting the posterior probability of the target classes, p(y|x). With time, 
virtual drifts may move to real concept drifts. Other interpretations can also 
be found in literature, for describing an incomplete representation of the data 
(Widmer and Kubat, 1993), and changes in the data distribution leading to 
changes in the decision boundary (Tsymbal, 2004). According to some 
authors, other events can also be seen as virtual drifts, like sampling shift 
(Salganicoff, 1997), temporary drifts (Lazarescu et al., 2004), and feature 
change (Salganicoff, 1997). As an example of virtual drift, we might consider 
the credit decision-making along the recent financial crisis. The lenders had 
to anticipate if a borrower would enter in default in the future (i.e. being bad). 
Despite of the macroeconomic factors have worsened, employed people with 
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lower debt to income remained good for the lenders, and so they continued to 
have access to credit.  Although we are mostly interested to track and detect 
changes in the real target concept, 𝑝(y|𝐱), the methodology introduced in this 
research attempts to cover both real concept and virtual drifts applied to the 
default concept drift detection and model rebuilding. 
 
2.4.2. Methods for adaptation 
 
Traditional methods for building a credit scoring model consider a static 
learning setting. In so doing, this task is based in learning in a predefined 
sample of past examples and then used to predict an actual or a potential 
borrower, in the future. This is an offline learning procedure, because the 
whole training dataset must be available when building the model. The model 
can only be used for predicting, after the training is completed, and then it is 
not re-trained alongside with its utilization. In other words, when the best 
separation function is achieved for a set of examples of the past, it is not 
updated for a while, possibly for years, independently of the changes in the 
hidden context or in the surrounding environment. New perspectives on 
model building arise together with the possibility of learning online. The 
driving idea is to process new incoming data sequentially, so that the model 
may be continuously updated. 
One of the most intuitive ideas for handling concept drift by instance selection 
is to keep rebuilding the model from a window that moves over the latest 
batches and use the learnt model for prediction on the immediate future. This 
idea assumes that the latest instances are the most relevant for prediction and 
that they contain the information of the current concept (Klinkenberg, 2004). 
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A framework connected with this idea consists in collecting the new incoming 
data for sequential batches in predefined time intervals, e.g. year by year, 
month by month, or every day. The accumulation of these batches generates 
a panel data flow for dynamic modelling. In Finance, it remains unclear 
whether it is best having a long memory or forgetting old events. If on the one 
hand, a long memory is desirable because it allows recalling a wider range of 
adjust to the present situation. A rapid adaptation to changes is achieved with 
a short window, because it reflects the current distribution of default more 
accurately. However, for the contrary reason, the performance of models built 
upon shorter windows worsens in stable periods. In credit risk assessment 
modelling, this matter has been indirectly discussed by practitioners and 
researchers when trying to figure the pros and cons of using a through-the-
cycle (TTC) or point-in-time (PIT) schema to calibrate the output of the 
scorecards to the current phase of the economic cycle. For years, a PIT 
schema was the only option, because banks did not have sufficient historical 
data series. Since the implementation of the Basel II Accord worldwide, 
banks are required to store the data of default for a minimum 7-years period 
and consider a minimum of 5-years period for calibrating the scorecards. 
An original idea of Widmer and Kubat (1996) uses a sliding window of fixed 
length with a data processing structure first-in-first-out (FIFO). Each window 
may consist of a single or multiple sequential batches, instead of single 
instances. At each new time step, the model is updated following two 
processes. In the first process, the model is rebuilt based on the training 
dataset of the most recent window. Then, a forgetting process discards the 
data that move out of the fixed-length window. 
Incremental algorithms (Widmer and Kubat, 1996) are a less extreme hybrid 
approach that allows updating the prediction of models to the new contexts. 
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They are able to process examples batch-by-batch, or one-by-one, and update 
the prediction model after each batch, or after each example. Incremental 
models may rely on random previous examples or in representative selected 
sets of examples, called incremental algorithms with partial memory (Maloof 
and Michalski, 2004). The challenge is to select an appropriate window size. 
 
2.5. Measuring performance 
 
Predictive modelling tries to find good rules (models) for guessing 
(predicting) the values of one or more variables in a dataset (target) from the 
values of other variables in the dataset. Our target is the quality of the 
individual, which can assume two values: bad or good. More than 
discriminating between these two possibilities, we will be interested in 
predicting the probability of defaulting (i.e. being bad). The models to use 
will then yield a scored dataset as a result of their training.  
The construction (training) of a model can be optimized to estimate only the 
probabilities of each class of the target variable, without incorporating any 
business objectives for which the predictor will be used. In our case the model 
would try to predict the probability of (not) default (i.e. being good). Next, 
we would be left with the decision of selecting a score cut-off, where 
individuals with risk score greater than or equal to a threshold would be 
accepted; others, below this cut-off would be rejected. This second stage 
would need to incorporate the adopted measure of business performance, be 
it profit, loss, volume of acquisitions, market share, etc. The ROC curves are 
well-suited for this second operation, enabling both to select the best cut-off 
for a given model and to compare multiple models, detecting dominant 
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models, points of intersection, etc. ROC curves are able to provide a richer 
measure of classification performance than scalar measures such as accuracy, 
error rate or error cost. Because they de-couple classifier performance from 
class skew and error costs, they have advantages over other evaluation 
measures such as precision-recall graphs and lift curves (Fawcett, 2006). 
However, as with any evaluation metric, there are some common 
misconceptions and pitfalls when using them in practice, so using them wisely 
requires knowing their characteristics and limitations (Hand and 
Anagnostopoulos, 2013).  
A two-step strategy has the benefit of being flexible in regards to changes in 
the measure of business performance. To accommodate a change in the loss 
or profit value, only the cut-off needs to be redefined, while the model is kept 
unchanged. Moreover, after selecting the best working point (cut-off), it is 
possible to perform a sensibility analysis, investigating how changes in the 
performance measure affect the performance of the model. It is important to 
stress that, often, losses or profits cannot be estimated with great certainty by 
experts on the company. Therefore, this two-step strategy is easily adapted to 
future changes. However, caution is in order: if the adopted measure of 
business performance leads to heavily different losses between the different 
possible errors, the operating point of the model will be strongly shifted away 
from the point for which it was trained (equal losses), possibly leading to a 
substantial degradation in performance. 
Another strategy would be to incorporate in the construction of the model the 
adopted measure of business performance. The training of the model would 
be focused not in the minimization of the misclassification rate but in the 
optimization of the profit or loss. In this case, the second stage of optimal cut-
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off selection is (almost) unnecessary8. By integrating the business 
performance in the model construction we expect to attain an ‘optimal’ 
classifier, tuned for the business criterion.  
 
2.5.1. ROC curves and optimal cut-off selection 
 
When designing a classifier we are essentially trying to minimize two types 
of errors: the error committed in identifying someone as defaulter, class B, 
when one is in fact a non-defaulter, class G, individual and the opposite type 
of error of diagnosing someone as non-defaulter when one is in fact a 
defaulter.  A confusion matrix (Table 2.2) can be used to lay out the different 
errors: 
Table 2.2: Confusion matrix C. 
 Predicted class 
True Class Defaulter, ?̂? Non-defaulter, ?̂? 
Defaulter, B 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) 
Non-defaulter, G 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) 
 
In this confusion matrix, 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) represents the probability of that model 
predicts as defaulter and the real class is non-defaulter; the other probabilities 
follow accordingly. Note that 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) + 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) = 𝑝(𝐵), the a priori default 
                                                          
8 However, not all models allow the incorporation of the loss or profit matrix in the 
construction process; others use it in a simplified or approximated mode. Therefore, a second 
stage of tuning the cut-off may reveal appropriate. 
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probability in the population. Likewise, 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) + 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) = 𝑝(𝐺), the a 
priori non-default probability in the population and naturally 𝑝(𝐵) + 𝑝(𝐺) =
1. 
We would like to minimize both 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) and 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?). At one extreme case if 
our classifier predicts defaulter for any individual we would have 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) =
0, but a presumably high 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) (in fact, equal to 𝑝(𝐺)); at the other end if 
the trained classifier predicts always non-defaulter we would have 𝑝(𝐺, 𝐵) =
0, but a non-zero 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) (in fact, equal to 𝑝(𝐵)). 
So, designing a classifier resumes to finding the best trade-off between these 
two types of errors. And the best trade off depends on the costs associated 
with each decision. Consider a generic loss matrix, LM (Table 2.3). 
 
 
Table 2.3: Generic loss matrix LM. 
 Predicted class 
True Class Defaulter Non-defaulter 
Defaulter 𝑙1 𝑙2 
Non-defaulter 𝑙3 𝑙4 
 
It is easy to see that the expected loss, 𝐸[𝐿], for a classifier with the confusion 
matrix C is: 
𝐸[𝐿] = 𝑙1 × 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) + 𝑙2𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) + 𝑙3 × 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) + 𝑙4𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) (5)  
Now 
𝑙1 × 𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) + 𝑙2𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?) 
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= 𝑝(𝐵) [𝑙1 ×
𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?)
𝑝(𝐵)
+ 𝑙2 × (1 −
𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?)
𝑝(𝐵)
)] 
 
= 𝑝(𝐵) [(𝑙1 − 𝑙2) ×
𝑝(𝐵, ?̂?)
𝑃(𝐵)
+ 𝑙2] (6)  
where 
𝑝(𝐵,?̂?)
𝑝(𝐵)
= 𝑝(?̂?|𝐵) is usually known as sensitivity or true positive rate.  
In the same way 
𝑙3 × 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) + 𝑙4 × 𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?) 
= 𝑝(𝐺) [(𝑙3 − 𝑙4) ×
𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?)
𝑝(𝐺)
+ 𝑙4] 
= 𝑝(𝐺)(𝑙3 − 𝑙4) (1 −
𝑝(𝐺, ?̂?)
𝑝(𝐺)
) + 𝑝(𝐺) × 𝑙4 (7)  
where 
𝑝(𝐺,?̂?)
𝑝(𝐺)
= 𝑝(?̂?|𝐺) is usually known as true negative rate or specificity.  
Then, 𝐸[𝐿] can be assumed as 
𝑝(𝐵)(𝑙1 − 𝑙2) × sensitivity + 𝑙2𝑝(𝐵) + 𝑃(𝐺)(𝑙3 − 𝑙4)(1 − specificity) + 𝑙4𝑝(𝐺) (8)  
Summarizing, the loss of a classifier depends linearly only on two parameters, 
the sensitivity and specificity, weighted by coefficients derived from the loss 
matrix and the a priori class probability on the population. This means that 
we can analyse the performance of a model in a 2D space, the (1- specificity, 
sensitivity) space.  
However, not all points in this space are possible for a model. Having trained 
a classifier to output the probability of defaulting, we can vary the cut-off 
parameter (the probability value at which we start declaring a client as 
defaulter) and, as we do so, trade specificity by sensitivity. Fig. 2.1 illustrates 
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an example of an ROC chart for two different classifiers. The ROC of a 
classifier shows this trade-off, plotting the achievable (1-specificity, 
sensitivity) values for a range of cut-offs.  
 
Fig. 2.1: ROC chart for two different classifiers.  
 
Each point on the curve represents a cut-off probability. Points closer to the 
upper-right corner correspond to low cut-off probabilities. Points in the lower 
left correspond to higher cut-off probabilities. The extreme points (1,1) and 
(0,0) represent no-data rules where all cases are classified into class Defaulter 
or class non-defaulter, respectively. Now, as shown above, the expected loss 
can be represented as a linear function of sensitivity and 1-specificity:  
𝐸[𝐿] = 𝑎 × (1 − specificity) + 𝑏 × sensitivity + 𝑐. (9)  
To minimize the loss we just have to walk in the direction opposite to the 
gradient of 𝐸[𝐿]. It is not difficult to see that the represented classifier B is 
dominant over classifier A, in the sense that, for any (reasonable) loss matrix 
considered, there is always an operation point of classifier B that is better than 
the best operating point of classifier A.  
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A different situation is depicted in Fig. 2.2. The ROC curve of classifier A 
intersects the ROC curve of the classifier C. Now, the best classifier depends 
on the loss matrix. The isocost line (a isocost line is a line of constant cost, 
perpendicular to the gradient of the loss function) shows the least loss line for 
a loss matrix M2 where the costs of missing a positive case severely 
outweighs the cost of raising a false alarm; in this case classifier C provides 
the best operating point. Conversely, the dotted isocost line shows the least 
loss line for a loss matrix M1 where the costs of missing a negative case 
severely outweighs the cost of raising a positive alarm. Now is classifier A 
that provides the best operating point as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. 
 
Fig. 2.2: Non-dominant ROCs.  
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2.5.2. Comparing models performance 
 
Throughout this research the experimental comparison of different models (or 
methods) is based in their ability to discriminate between the two target 
classes. The discriminatory power is measured with the Gini coefficient, a 
typical evaluation criteria among researchers and in the industry (Rêzác and 
Rêzác, 2011), which can be calculated as 2 × 𝐴𝑈𝐶 − 1, where AUC is the 
area under the ROC curve. The Gini coefficient refers to the global quality of 
the credit scoring model, and may range between -1 and 1. The perfect scoring 
model fully distinguishes the two target classes, good and bad, and has a Gini 
index equal to 1. A model with a random output has a Gini coefficient equal 
to zero. If the coefficient is negative, then scores have a reverse meaning. The 
extreme case -1 would mean that all examples of the good class are being 
predicted as bad, and vice-versa. In this case, the perfect model can be 
achieved just by switching the prediction. Loans’ records with unknown score 
are not included in the calculations of this indicator. 
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3. Credit scoring models degradation  
 
 
Abstract - Evidence from the Freddie Mac’s single loan-level dataset, first 
published in March 2013, shows that existing scores are effective to order 
individuals by risk, but they are not prepared to predict real default in each 
point in time.  
We investigate the dynamics and performance of over 16.7 million of fully 
amortized 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S., originated between 1999 
and the first quarter of 2013. We identify the frailties of the frameworks used 
in default prediction, to draw implications to risk-based pricing designs. 
Analysis shows that not only scores diminished their ability to predict default 
when the mortgage crisis has come to public’s attention, but also that real 
default rates by score are irregular over time. It is also apparent that, since 
2009, lenders are firmly declining the subprime loans, and as a result the 1-
year cumulative default by vintage has declined. There is a link between 
scores, lending and default, mostly influenced by the lending practices. There 
is a link between scores, default and pricing, but the mapping between them 
is far from being adequate. 
 
 
 
Parts of this chapter are published in the Journal of Economics, Business and Management 
with the title “Links between Scores, Real Default and Pricing: Evidence from the Freddie 
Mac’s Loan-level Dataset”. JOEBM 2015 Vol.3(12): 1106-1114 ISSN: 2301-3567; 
DOI:10.7763/JOEBM.2015.V3.343. 
Some sections are repeated through the dissertation to make the chapters self-contained. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
The subprime mortgage lending crisis in the U.S. came to public’s attention 
when home foreclosures begun to rise in 2006 and moved out of control in 
2007. A large decline in home prices prompted a devaluation housing-related 
securities and an unprecedented rise in mortgage delinquencies. This brought 
into light the disproportionate risk assumed in mortgage lending in the last 
decade, along the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, between 2001 and 
2005. This crisis echoed severely in the financial arena and in real economies 
worldwide. The collapse of several major financial institutions in 2008, 
promoted the distrust inside the financial systems. As a consequence, banks' 
liquidity plummeted with a significant disruption of the financing of 
businesses and consumers. Thus far, the U.S. and the European Communities 
are still recovering from a severe recession. This spawned intensive debates 
towards causes and possible remedies, in view of achieving transparency and 
global financial stability. 
Since 21 March 2013, Freddie Mac1 is making available loan-level credit 
performance data on a portion of fully amortized 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgages that the company purchased or guaranteed since 1999. This had 
never been done before by a loan level agency. The data is provided in a 
“living” dataset (Freddie Mac, June 2013a). By June 2014, the dataset 
covered over 16.7 million of fully amortized, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in 
the U.S., originated between 1999 and the first quarter of 2013. These loans 
represent a total amount granted of over 3,020 US B$. Disseminating these 
                                                          
1 Freddie Mac is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), a public 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) in the U.S. It was created in 1970 to expand the 
secondary market for mortgages in the U.S. 
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data follows the direction of the regulator, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), as a part of a larger effort to increase transparency and 
promote risk sharing. The primary goal of turning this data available is to help 
investors build more accurate credit performance models in support of the 
risk sharing initiatives highlighted by the FHFA in the 2013 conservatorship 
scorecard (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2013). The availability of such 
a large real world financial dataset also creates an unprecedented opportunity 
for researchers and practitioners, as it allows a more profound investigation 
on the roots of the global crisis. The aggregated data summary statistics are 
updated by Freddie Mac (June 2014b).  
Anderson, Scott, and Janet Jozwik (2014) proposed a framework for 
developing a credit model based on this dataset. For a 180-days delinquent 
target event, the authors conclude that much of the variation in credit 
performance across loans and over different stages of the economic cycle is 
explained by loan-level variables. Unsurprisingly, by adding factors to 
capture broader macroeconomic effects and the quality of underwriting, they 
significantly improve the model. Goodman, Landy, Ashworth and Yang 
(2014) present an exploratory paper providing a first look through the data, 
to find potential implications for guarantee pricing. The authors show the 
vintage composition as a percentage of the initial balance in a cross-analysis 
of the original borrowers’ FICO score by the original loan to value (LTV). 
They follow the cumulative default in three groups in the score ranges 300 to 
700, 700 to 750 and 750 to 850 crossed by the original LTV in selected 
buckets. They conclude that default rates are dramatically higher on higher 
LTV/lower scores, and so, investors should look not only at the average LTV 
and FICO scores, but also at the FICO/LTV loans’ distribution. The authors 
conjecture that pricing these pools by looking at averages are likely to lead to 
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under-priced default risk, but they do not present evidence.  
Discussion is being pushed towards risk-based pricing. Previous studies 
suggest that risk-based pricing models will rely mostly in credit scores. This 
research extends the existing published work by proving meaningful insights 
on the link between credit score, lending practices, real default and pricing. 
In this chapter we address the question: is there is a link between scores, real 
default and pricing? 
Our research confirms that there is a link between scores, default and pricing, 
but the mapping between them is far from being adequate. New evidence 
from the Freddie Mac’s single loan level data shows that although existing 
scores consistently order portfolios’ risk, real default rates by score are quite 
irregular over time. This means that existing scores are effective to order 
borrowers’ risk, but they are not prepared to adapt predictions to real default 
in each point in time. 
This chapter follows in section 3.2 with the formalization of the problem and 
a description of the research background. In section 3.3, we present an 
overview of credit scoring models. First, we review the current role of credit 
scoring in the advanced economies, and then we present credit scoring 
formulation, for an in-depth understanding. The section ends with a brief 
explanation of current capabilities and potential frailties of credit scoring 
models when they are used at the basis of credit risk underwriting and risk-
based pricing. Experimental design is explained in section 3.4, and results are 
provided in section 3.5. Selected outcomes are presented in order to illustrate 
dynamics over time, and focusing the dimensions in analysis: score buckets, 
lending practices, observed defaults and pricing. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 3.6. 
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3.2. Problem and research background  
 
3.2.1. The problem 
 
Lenders determine if the risk of lending to a borrower is acceptable under 
certain parameters of credit risk, borrower’s credit capacity and collateral 
evaluation. Nowadays, in retail lending, the risk of a great proportion of the 
loan applications is automatically evaluated. In this setting, credit score is the 
central, if not unique, indicator of the borrowers’ credit risk, either when the 
credit decision assessment is fully automatic or when it is an input for human 
decision. An individual without a credit score or with a low score (meaning 
high risk) is unlikely to have credit, whilst an application of a person with a 
high score has good chances to be accepted.  An analysis on the causes and 
effects of the mortgage meltdown (Bianco, 2008) states that in 2007, 40% of 
all subprime loans have been generated by automatic underwritings in the 
U.S. This had been associated to lax controls in the underwriting processes. 
The author argues that the automated processes meant fasters decision, but 
less documentation scrutiny. The acceptance standards have also moved 
rapidly towards credit score’s over-dependence. Hence, the performance of 
credit loans strongly relies in the credit scoring models accuracy, both in the 
short-term as in the long-run predictions, which is too hard to achieve. In 
2007, the delinquency rate rose sharply, both in borrowers in the lower scores 
as in the highest scores bands, showing that the actual risk of these borrowers 
have been underestimated.    
Enhancing loans risk-based pricing models in the track of the previous studies 
(Anderson and Jozwik, 2014, Goodman et al., 2014) will much depend on the 
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knowledge and ability to improve the existing credit scoring robustness. This 
entails a deeper understanding of their actual strengths and insufficiencies.  
 
3.2.2. Research background 
 
To our knowledge, research in credit risk assessment often lacks from 
validation in representative real world environments, and most of the 
experimental designs use datasets that are not representative of each phase in 
the economic cycles. Hence, a significant number of empirical studies have 
no generalization ability. In particular, trying to screen credit losses and 
predicting credit default of future credit operations may become critical if 
there is neither sufficient knowledge of the past neither of the future 
circumstances. In this setting, theoretical contributions have limited impact in 
real world decisions.  
The unavailability of representative datasets has shortened the space to turn 
evident in which conditions the existing credit scoring models may be 
ineffective, like biased credit policies, drifting population and recessions. The 
single-family mortgage loan level dataset creates an unprecedented 
opportunity for researchers and practitioners, as long as it enables the 
simulation of theoretical frameworks in real-world stressed environments. 
 
3.3. Credit scoring fundamentals and current use 
 
3.3.1. Score - a standard risk assessment in the advanced economies 
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Financial industry turned over-dependent of credit scoring over the last few 
decades. The origin of these models traces back to the World War II, which 
promoted the first expert systems to evaluate a person’s credit worthiness. As 
credit analysts were called to fight, finance houses and mail-order firms 
requested them to write down their rules for deciding whom to give loans. 
Some of these were numerical scoring systems and others were sets of 
conditions that needed to be satisfied – expert systems. In the early 1950s, 
Bill Fair and Earl Isaac created the first consultancy directed to finance 
houses, retailers and mail-orders firms, making use of statistically derived 
models in lending decision. Until 1970 credit risk assessment relied most 
exclusively in human judgment. Connected with the lending activities, this 
task was typically performed to support decision-making, following a specific 
credit application. The labour of the person responsible for the evaluation, 
often a branch manager, would involve the analysis of the likelihood of a 
customer repaying his debt, based on a number of clues that the manager 
could gather on site from a community leader or an external entity, such as 
the employer, a credit bureau or even another lender. Main aspects that he 
would check would concern to the customer character and honesty and his 
ability to create wealth. The depth of reasoning behind a decision could 
largely vary and the final decision would likely depend on the evaluator's 
mood and instinct. From customer application to the decision or credit 
granting, the process was usually slow (Thomas et al., 2002). Nowadays, 
scoring models are used in credit approval, risk management, internal capital 
allocation and in corporate governance functions of banks using the IRB 
approach. In the U.S., since its introduction 20 years ago, FICO score is 
calculated from the information available in the individuals’ credit bureau 
reports, and has become an industry standard. It is claimed to be used in 90% 
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of lending decisions, to determine how much money each individual can 
borrow, and how much interest he will pay. In the OECD countries, banks 
that have adopted the Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB) in Basel II, 
internally developed credit scoring models play an essential role in the 
calculation of the minimum regulatory capital. In the European Market, there 
are 89 banks using the IRB. In the U.S., the largest banks also adopted the 
Basel II Accord, introduced via Capital Requirements Directive. In line with 
this evolution, financial industry moves toward a more intensive use of credit 
scores at the basis of risk-based pricing models.  
 
3.3.2. Scoring models – strengths and frailties 
 
The huge success of credit scoring models in the advanced economies is 
partly explained by their appealing representation is a linear scale. Credit 
scoring models have also proved to a powerful measure to order a population 
of individuals according to their credit risk. The best scoring model is the one 
that differentiates the most the two target classes, good and bad, commonly 
referred as discriminatory power.   
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3.3.2.1. Human misconception  
 
Although the true meaning of scores is a probability of default (PD) with a 
non-linear shape, as in Fig. 3.1(a), human cognition retains the linear 
representation, Fig. 3.1(b), rather than the actual non-linear shape. Through 
our experience in developing credit scoring models it became apparent that 
many of the risk managers were basing their credit risk assessments on the 
linear representation. Doing so is suitable for ordering risks, but it is 
insufficient to calculate losses or pricing credit risks. 
(a) True meaning - Probability of default by score. 
 
(b) Misconception - Human cognition of risk by score. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Actual meaning of scores and human misconception of the risk.  
Authors’ analysis, illustrative scorecard: the score 660 has a good/bad odd of 15 good 
individuals to 1 bad, and for each additional 15 score points the good/bad odds double. 
 
3.3.2.2. Economic cycle and scores misalignment 
 
Traditional systems that are the basis of credit scoring models are one-shot, 
fixed memory-based, trained from fixed training sets. Since static models are 
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not prepared to process the highly detailed evolving data, they are not able to 
continuously maintain an output (PD) consistent with the current state, or to 
quickly react to changes (Gama, 2010). When there are significant changes in 
the conditions, scores’ PD (Fig. 3.2, dashed line) may become misaligned2 
with the observed default (Fig. 3.2, solid line). 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Illustration of scores misalignment. 
Authors’ analysis based on the Freddie Mac’s database. Forecasted PD’s by score same as 
the default rate of the mortgages originated in 1999, and observed PD’s the real default rates 
in 2007. Performance measured in the 1-year after the loans were originated. 
 
As the processes underlying credit risk are not strictly stationary, consumers’ 
behaviour and default can change over time in unpredictable ways. There are 
several types of evolution inside a population, like population drifts, that 
translate into changes in the distributions of the variables, affecting the 
performance of the models. 
When the economic conditions evolve in the economic cycle, deteriorating or 
improving, the behaviour of the individuals, and their ability of repaying their 
debts also vary. In addition, default evolution echoes trends of the business 
                                                          
2 The terms alignment, adjustment and calibration are commonly used with the same 
meaning.  
Observed
Forecasted
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
D
e
fa
u
lt
Score
 47 
 
cycle, and related with this, regulatory movements, and interest rates 
fluctuations. In good times, banks and borrowers tend to be overoptimistic 
about the future, whilst in times of recession banks are swamped with 
defaulted loans, high provisions, and capital buffers turn highly conservative. 
The former leads to more liberal credit policies and lower credit standards, 
the later promotes sudden credit-cuts. Empirical evidence and theoretical 
frameworks support a positive, and lagged relationship between rapid credit 
growth and loan losses (Sousa et al., 2015a).  
In order to adapt models’ output to changes over time, institutions should 
calibrate their scoring models according to the most recent information. 
Models’ adjustments, or calibration, commonly consider selected 
macroeconomic public indicators and should be periodically revised. 
However, this may take too long to occur. The European Banking Authority 
reports that there is not a common practice among Regulators towards models 
calibration. Many countries do not define any specific rules and, when they 
do, they are usually not public. When they define some rules, they are rarely 
convergent; and different countries favour different calibration choices (EBA, 
2013b). Should there be significant changes in between scheduled modelling 
developments or adjustments, it is not certain that banks will anticipate any 
of these tasks, as it can largely depend on judgmental reasoning or over-
layered decision frameworks.  
In the following, we will analyse the Freddie Mac’s database to find evidence 
on the previous limitations. Complementing the previous works, we provide 
a fine-graded time-analysis over scores and analyse in which conditions risk-
based pricing has been implemented. Furthermore, we study the extent of 
misalignment of PD’s with the real default by score over time. 
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3.4. Experimental design 
 
The research summarized here was conducted in the Freddie Mac’s single 
family mortgage loan-level dataset, first published in March 2013. We follow 
the performance of 16.737 million of fully amortized 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgages loans in the U.S., originated between January 1, 1999 and March 
31, 2013. The loans performance3 is outlined in a monthly basis and, at the 
time of this research, data for performing loans and those that were up to 180 
days delinquent were available through September 30, 2013. 
The dataset is a “living” dataset updated over time, typically at the end of 
each quarter, and may be subjected to periodical corrections by Freddie Mac. 
The release changes  are recorded (Freddie Mac, June 2014a). A general user 
guide describing the file layout and data dictionary is also provided (Freddie 
Mac, June 2013b).  
Freddie Mac’s information regarding the key loan attributes and performance 
metrics can be linked to our research in the aggregated summary statistics. 
  
                                                          
3 Loan performance information includes the monthly loan balance, delinquency status and 
information regarding termination events: Voluntary prepayments in full; 180 days 
delinquency (“D180”); Repurchases prior to D180; Third-party sales prior to D180; Short 
sales prior to D180; Deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure prior to D180; Real estate owned (REO) 
acquisition prior to D180. Also includes voluntary prepayments and loans that were short 
sales, deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, third party sales, and REOs. 
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3.4.1. Methodology 
 
We attempt to describe the most significant events in the period. We are both 
interested in determining the main contrasts by score, and to illustrate the 
dynamics over time. First, we illustrate the volumes and compare the original 
interest rate with the annual average FIX 304. In so doing, our aim is to use a 
representation of the credit risk spread evaluation over time and understand 
the extent of under-priced loans that has been referred as one cause of the 
crisis. Then, we determine the evolution of default over time and the 
performance of the scores at the basis of the credit risk assessment. For 
assigning the default event, we used the information of the loan delinquency 
status in each reporting period. In this analysis we consider that a borrower 
entered in default if he was ever 90 or more days delinquent, the typical 
definition used under the Basel II. Default is assigned to the first occurrence 
of this event. We use vintage analysis and hence, we consider cumulative 
default along time. 
 
3.4.2. Data aggregation 
 
Although we have found missing values in the score, we intentionally kept 
these cases in the analysis to entirely represent the extent of information (or 
absence) at the basis of the original risk assessment. Data of the original 
datasets were aggregated by the origination year. 
                                                          
4 FIX 30 is the interest rate of a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. 
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Scores may vary in the range 301-850, or be unknown. Situations where the 
score is unknown are described by Freddie Mac (June 2013b)5. To compare 
evolutions over time, we divided the range into equidistant intervals of 25, 
except for the lower and upper bounds. To have dimension, these bounds were 
aggregated in the buckets [300, 550[ and [800, 850[, respectively. 
 
3.4.3. Scores - performance, concentration and stability measures 
 
The discriminatory power of the model was measured based on the Gini 
coefficient, equivalent to consider the area under the ROC curve (AUC), 
which is a typical evaluation criteria among researchers and in the industry 
(Rêzác and Rêzác, 2011). This coefficient refers to the global quality of the 
credit scoring model, and may range between -1 and 1. The perfect scoring 
model fully distinguishes the two target classes, good and bad, and has a Gini 
index equal to 1. A model with a random output has a Gini coefficient equal 
to zero. If the coefficient is negative, then the scores have a reverse meaning. 
The extreme case -1 would mean that all examples of the good class are being 
predicted as bad, and vice-versa. In this case, the perfect model can be 
achieved just by switching the prediction. Loans’ records with unknown score 
were not included in the calculations of this indicator. 
The concentration of loans by score buckets was measured with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is defined as ∑ 𝑓𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where n is 
the number of score buckets and 𝑓𝑖 is the number of customers in that bucket 
                                                          
5 A possible reason is when the seller requires a reduced level of verification. 
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relative to the total portfolio. By definition, the index varies between 0 and 
100%. An index of 100% means that borrowers are concentrated in a single 
bucket. In this work we will consider that values below 20% are commonly 
acceptable. Values above it suggests highly concentrated scores. 
The stability index was measured comparing the distribution of the population 
in each year with the distribution of the population in the first year in the 
period, 1999. For the year 𝑡, 𝑡 = 2000, . . , 2013 the stability index is 
calculated as: 
∑(𝑓𝑖,1999 − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖,1999 𝑓𝑖,𝑡⁄ )
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1)  
where n is the number of score buckets, and 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is the number of borrowers 
in that bucket relative to the number of borrowers in the total portfolio in the 
year t. 
 
3.5. Results 
 
There are a number of theories regarding the origins of the mortgage crisis. 
In this chapter we are concerned to extend knowledge on the potential 
misalignment of the risk indicators that were at the basis of credit approval 
before crisis. Then, we assess the extent of undervaluation of the credit risk, 
and hence, credit risk mispricing. As credit risk assessment is anchored in the 
borrowers’ score at the origin of the loan, the analysis is focused in the 
dimensions score and time. Results are mostly motivated to present evidence 
on the following: 
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 Risk taking and pricing; 
 Changes in the lending practices after the crisis; 
 Risk assessment over time - default rates, default misalignment and 
scores performance. 
 
3.5.1. Risk taking and pricing 
 
The evolution of new loans over the analysed period illustrates the U.S. 
housing bubble between 2001 and 2005. The highest peak occur between 
2001 and 2003, where the number of new loans continuously rose from nearly 
800 thousand loans in 2000 to 1,930 thousands in 2003 (Table 3.1, first row). 
This massive increase of the number of loans was one of the sources of the 
raise in the real state property values, which reached a peak in 2005. 
Our analysis confirms that scores are intensively used to differentiate the 
mortgages interest rates. As illustrated in Table 3.2, there is a decreasing trend 
of the average interest rate from the lower to the higher score buckets. It can 
be said that a risk-based pricing based in scores is being applied. Until 2009, 
borrowers with the highest scores were borrowing below the average FIX 30. 
In 2007, the default of the borrowers with scores 650 or higher has almost 
tripled in relation to the previous years. Adjustments to the risk premium were 
made by 2009, as it can be seen in Fig. 3.3. From this point onwards, rates are 
higher than FIX 30, suggesting that pricing policy had been revised. Loans 
have been priced below the FIX 30 in 2001, both in the aggregate level and 
in each score bucket (Table 3.1, rows 7, 8 and 9). Loans’ average rate was 
maintained through 2001 and 2002, in the aggregate level and in score 
buckets’ level (Table 3.2). This effect may be linked to the crash of the dot-
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com bubble in 2000 which has been associated to the beginning of the decline 
in real long-term interest rates. In reaction to the crash of the dot-com bubble 
in 2000 and to the recession that began in 2001, the Federal Reserve Board 
has cut short-term interest rates from 6.5% to 1% (Bianco, 2008). Mortgage 
interest rates continued to decline until 2005 (Table 3.2). As the mortgage 
rates are typically set relation to 10-year Treasury bond yields, this was an 
outcome of very low Fed funds’ rates in the period. Lenders were self-reliant 
that they were taking little risk because the value of the collateral was rising 
too fast, but they missed to understand that it would come to an end. Loans 
underwritten between 2001 and 2005 account for 42% of the amount 
originated in the period (Table 3.4). There is a theory (Hull, 2009) referring 
that in this period, lenders had begun to take more risk in subprime6 
mortgages. Our analysis provides a divergent finding, because neither the 
number of loans nor the amount granted has increased during the mortgage 
bubble (Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, see rows for scores’ buckets bellow score 
625). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
6 A rule of thumb for the subprime mortgage is a loan of a borrower with a score inferior to 
620. Some lenders also consider a subprime mortgage if the borrower has a score up to 680 
and the down payment is less than 5% of the loan. 
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Table 3.1: Freddie Mac database – loans main indicators, 1999-2013(Q1). 
Indicator 
Origination year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2013 
(Q1) 
Total loans 
(thousands) 
1.095 787 1.757 1.685 1.930 1.131 1.324 1.083 1.069 986 1.513 788 556 787 247 
Total original 
amount (billion 
US $) 
138 104 260 262 311 188 240 202 202 210 345 177 131 192 58 
Avg original 
loan amount 
(‘000 US $) 
126 132 148 156 161 167 181 187 189 213 228 224 236 244 237 
Scores 
concentration 
index67 
13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 13% 13% 12% 12% 14% 20% 19% 20% 21% 20% 
Scores stability 
index78 
n.a. 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
Average interest 
rate (AIR) (%)89 
7,31 8,18 6,58 6,58 5,78 5,86 5,88 6,44 6,41 6,10 5,02 4,81 4,59 3,81 3,64 
AIR-FIX 30 (%) -0,13 0,13 -0,39 0,04 -0,05 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,07 0,07 -0,02 0,12 0,14 0,15 … 
AIR at a low 
score - FIX 30 
(%)910 
0,02 0,33 -0,14 0,29 0,12 0,16 0,14 0,17 0,25 0,49 0,44 0,56 0,51 0,46 … 
AIR at the 
highest scores - 
FIX 30 (%)9 
-0,17 0,04 -0,50 -0,07 -0,09 -0,02 -0,04 -0,02 -0,02 -0,04 -0,07 0,05 0,07 0,12 … 
 …: not available. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
67We used Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), for which values below 20% are commonly 
considered acceptable. 
78We used population stability index, for which values below 0,25 are commonly considered 
normal. 
89Calculated as the weighted average of rates by score buckets. 
910For low scores we considered the scores in the range [600; 625[; for the highest scores we 
considered the scores in the range [800; 850[. 
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Table 3.2: Freddie Mac database – original interest rates, 1999-2013(Q1). Unit %. 
 
3.5.2. Changes in lending after the crisis 
 
Major drifts have occurred in lending practices in reaction to the crisis, which 
was noticed both in the acceptance scores thresholds (Table 3.3) as well as in 
the underlying credit risk spreads (Fig. 3.3). From 2009 onwards, interest 
rates were increased in all scores, when compared to the average FIX 30 in 
the year. 
 
Fig. 3.3. Freddie Mac database - gap between the interest rate and the FIX rate. 
 
Borrowers’ score is a key indicator in mortgage lending. From 2009 onwards, 
the amount on loans in the scores bellow 625 is zero (Table 3.4), meaning 
that lending to low scored borrowers was firmly contained since then. By that 
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year, lending moved markedly to the higher scores (see the shape of the bars 
moving between years 2008 and 2009, in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). This effect 
is also captured in the score stability index that jumps from 0,10 to 0,28 in 
2009 (Table 3.1, row 5). As a consequence, there is an increase in the 
concentration by scores from 14% in 2008 to around 20% in 2009 and in the 
following years (Table 3.1, row 4). Although this seems to be a reasonable 
prudential measure, we draw attention towards potential excessive lending 
bias and concentration in the highest scores, which requires a more precise 
risk-based pricing in these score bands. The number and amount of loans 
decreased after 2009. 
Table 3.3: Freddie Mac database – number of loans, 1999-2013(Q1). 
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Table 3.4: Freddie Mac database – amount granted, 1999-2013(Q1). Unit: US B$. 
 
Table 3.5: Freddie Mac database – 1-year default by vintage, 1999-2013(Q1). 
 
 
3.5.3. Risk over time – scores default misalignment 
 
Fig. 3.4(a) shows the cumulative default for the aggregated loans in each 
origination year, and measuring the performance in two time windows: 2 
years (dashed line) and 5 or more years after the loans have been underwritten 
(solid line). An interesting finding is that, although the mortgage bubble had 
expanded between 2001 and 2005, the higher default rates have occurred for 
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the loans granted from 2004 through 2008. Loans originated in the beginning 
of the boom have not higher defaults than the loans in the previous years; only 
the borrowers that have underwritten after 2003 had defaulted more. This 
finding suggests that the first borrowers of the boom were just the “lucky 
ones” who borrowed cheaper; only then, the opportunistic (most likely fraud) 
and deluded borrowers entered in the “game”. Future research would much 
benefit from distinguishing default originated in fraud, possibly by depicting 
the early-stage delinquencies. Our results also reveal that, in relation to the 
year before crisis, in 2006, default rates more than doubled in the loans 
originated in 2007, from 0.41% to 1.02% and tripled by 2008, reaching 1.35% 
at the aggregate level (Table 3.5). This could be used as a benchmark for risk 
volatility when stress-testing current and future credit scoring and risk-based 
pricing models. Results also confirm that borrowers with the worst scores are 
more vulnerable to stressed conditions, e.g. unemployment and sudden credit-
cuts, which intuition also suggests. 
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(a) Cumulative default rate in the loans’ aggregate by origination year. 
 
(b) Discriminatory power of scores, measured with Gini coefficient. 
 
Fig. 3.4. Freddie Mac database - performance measures. 
The top figure shows the cumulative default by origination year and the bottom figure shows 
the discriminatory power of scores. Measures are calculated in two windows: 2 years and 5+ 
years after the credit was originated. 
 
In 2002, credit scoring models started to decrease their ability to discriminate 
between good and bad customers in the long-term (Fig. 3.4(b), solid line), and 
in 2003, they started to decrease in the short-term (Fig. 3.4(b), dashed line). 
This effect may be an outcome of population drifts, which requires further 
investigation of the influence of this event in credit assessment.  
Finally, our research shows that real default rates by score are extremely 
irregular over time (Table 3.5), which requires further consideration in 
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models alignment, either when they are used in credit decision making or in 
risk-based pricing designs.  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
Financial industry turned over-dependent on credit scoring in the advanced 
economies. A high proportion of the loan applications are automatically 
decided. In this framework, credit score is the central, if not the unique, 
indicator of the borrowers’ credit risk. 
We found evidence that the cumulative default by vintage has almost tripled 
in first years of crisis for scores equal to 650 or higher, suggesting that credit 
risk may has been under-priced in these cases. Two years after the crash, 
lending decision threshold changed and lending moved markedly to 
borrowers with higher scores, which led to an increase in concentration of 
lending in these individuals. Although this is a reasonable prudential measure, 
excessive lending bias and concentration towards the highest scores require 
more precise default estimation to correctly price credit risk. 
Therefore, credit scoring models should properly adapt to time-changing 
conditions and lending dynamics, so that they faithfully support risk taking 
and pricing. Any misalignment between the PD’s by score and the real default 
over time will guide to inconsistent decisions and suboptimal prices. There is 
a new emphasis on running predictive models with the ability of sensing 
themselves and learn adaptively (Gama, 2010, Adams et al., 2010, Pavlidis et 
al., 2012). This is one area where more sophistication is needed and more 
effort should be put to promote their wider acceptance. 
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4. A first approach to dynamic credit scoring 
 
 
Abstract - In this chapter we propose a two-stage model for dealing with the 
temporal degradation of credit scoring models. First, we develop a model 
from a classical framework, with a static supervised learning setting and 
binary output. Then, we introduce the time-changing economic factors, using 
a regression between the macroeconomic data and the internal default in the 
portfolio. In so doing, the specific risk is captured from the bank internal 
database, and the movement of systemic risk is determined with the 
regression. This methodology produced motivating results in a 1-year 
horizon, for a portfolio of customers with credit cards in a financial institution 
operating in Brazil. We anticipate that it can be extended to other applications 
of risk assessment with great success. This methodology can be further 
improved if more information about the economic cycles is integrated in the 
forecasting of default. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parts of this chapter have been published in the proceedings of the conference BRICS 
Countries Congress on Computational Intelligence (BRICS-CCI), held in Brazil in 2013, 
with the title “A two-stage model for dealing with temporal degradation of credit scoring”. 
The methodology was used in the model than won the competition in the area of data mining 
and Finance promoted by that conference.  
Some sections are repeated through the dissertation to make the chapters self-contained.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 
In retail banking, credit risk assessment often relies in credit scoring models 
developed with supervised learning methods used to evaluate a person’s credit 
worthiness, so-called scoring or PD models1. The output of these models is a 
score that translates a probability of a customer becoming a defaulter, usually 
in a fixed future period. Nowadays, these models are at the core of the banking 
business, because they are central to credit decision-making, in price 
settlement, and to determine the cost of capital. Moreover, central banks and 
international regulation have rapidly evolved to a structure where the use of 
these models is implicit, to achieve soundness standards for credit risk 
valuation in banking system.  
Since 2004, with the implementation of regulations issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision within Basel II, banks were encouraged 
to strengthen their internal models frameworks for reaching the A-IRB 
(Advanced Internal Rating Based) accreditation. To achieve this certification, 
banks had to demonstrate that they were capable of accurately evaluating their 
risks, complying with Basel II requirements, by using their internal risk 
models’ systems, and keep their soundness. Banks owning A-IRB 
accreditation gained an advantage over the others, because they were allowed 
to use lower coefficients to weight the exposure of credit at risk, and benefit 
from lower capital requirements. A lot of improvements have been made in 
the existing rating frameworks, extending the use of data mining tools and 
artificial intelligence. Yet, this may have been bounded by a certain 
                                                          
1 Other names can be used to refer to PD models, namely: credit scoring, credit risk models, 
scorecards, credit scorecards, rating systems or rating models, although some have different 
meanings. 
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unwillingness to accept less intuitive algorithms or models going beyond 
standard solutions being implemented in the banking industry, settled in-house 
or delivered through analytics providers (e.g. FICO, Experian, PwC and 
KPMG).  
To our knowledge, developing and implementing a credit scoring model can 
be time and resources consuming – easily ranging from 9 to 18 months, from 
data extraction until deployment. Hence, banks use unchanged credit scoring 
models for several years. Bearing in mind that models are built using a sample 
file frequently comprising 2 or more years of historical data, in the best case 
scenario, data used in the models training are shifted 3 years away from the 
point they will be used. However, to our knowledge an 8-year shift is 
frequently exceeded. Should conditions remain unchanged, then this would 
not significantly affect the accuracy of the model, otherwise, its performance 
can greatly deteriorate over time. The recent financial crisis confirmed that 
financial environment significantly fluctuates unexpectedly, bringing renewed 
attention regarding scorecards built upon frames that are by far outdated. By 
2007-2008, many financial institutions were using stale scorecards built with 
historical data of the early-decade. The degradation of stationary credit scoring 
models is an issue with empirical evidence in the literature (Crook et al., 1992, 
Lucas, 2004), however research is still lacking more realistic solutions.  
Dominant approaches usually stand on static learning models. However, as 
the economic conditions evolve in the economic cycle, deteriorating or 
improving, the behaviour of the individuals also vary and their ability of 
repaying their debts. Furthermore, default evolution echoes trends of the 
business cycle, and related with this, regulatory movements, and interest rates 
fluctuations. In good times, banks and borrowers tend to be overoptimistic 
about the future, whilst in times of recession banks are swamped with 
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defaulted loans, high provisions, and tighten capital buffers. The former leads 
to more liberal credit policies and lower credit standards, the later promotes 
sudden credit-cuts. Empirical evidence and theoretical frameworks support a 
positive, and lagged relationship between rapid credit growth and loan losses 
(Sousa et al., 2015a). Therefore, default needs to be regarded as time 
changing. Public studies are mostly motivated by capital consumption and 
regulatory concerns, and therefore they are focused in modelling 
macroeconomic factors. So far, none has explicitly integrated these factors in 
the existing credit scoring models. 
Traditional systems that are one-shot, fixed memory-based, trained from 
fixed training sets are not prepared to process the highly detailed evolving 
data. Therefore, they are not able to continuously maintain an output model 
consistent with the actual state, or to quickly react to changes (Gama, 2010). 
These are some of the features of classic approaches that show that the 
existing credit scoring systems are limited. As the processes underlying credit 
risk are not strictly stationary, consumers’ behaviour and default can change 
over time in unpredictable ways. There are several types of evolution inside 
a population, like population drifts, that translate into changes in the 
distributions of the variables, affecting the performance of the models. There 
is a new emphasis on running predictive models with the ability of sensing 
themselves and learn adaptively (Gama, 2010). Advances on the concepts for 
knowledge discovery from data streams suggest alternative perspectives to 
identify, understand and efficiently manage dynamics of behaviour in 
consumer credit in changing environments. In a world in which events are not 
preordained and little is certain, what we do in the present affects how events 
unfold in unexpected ways.  
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This chapter follows in section 4.2 with a brief description of the problem and 
the research objectives; in section 4.3 the database is succinctly presented. 
Section 4.4 details the methodology and theoretical framework of this 
chapter. A one-dimensional analysis is presented, as well as an overall 
assessment of the data available for modelling. A multidimensional approach 
is exposed in section 4.5 where we propose a two-stage model for dealing 
with the temporal degradation of credit scoring. In the first stage we develop 
a credit scoring, by comparing several supervised learning methods. In the 
second stage, we introduce the effect of time changing environment by 
shifting the initial predictions by a factor of the expected variation of default. 
Results in a 1-year horizon are presented in section 4.6. Conclusions and 
future applications of the two-stage model are discussed in section 4.7.  
 
4.2. Problem and research objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to propose a new approach for dealing with the 
temporal degradation of a portfolio of customers with credit cards in a 
financial institution operating in Brazil. Our work is attached to the BRICS 
2013 competition, and is based in a real world dataset, along two years of 
operation, from 2009 to 2010. This competition consisted of two tasks, each 
focused on two features of the credit risk assessment model: 
Task 1: Develop a scorecard, tilting between the robustness in a static 
modelling sample and the performance degradation over time, potentially 
caused by market gradual changes along few years of business operation. 
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Task 2: Fitting of the estimated delinquency produced by an estimation 
model to that observed on the actual data for the applications approved 
by the scorecard. 
Participants were encouraged to use any modelling technique, under 
a temporal degradation or concept drift perspective. The official performance 
metrics were the area under the ROC curve (AUC) for task 1, and the 
Chi-square for the monthly estimates of delinquency in task 2.  Innovative 
ways of handling task 1 can be found in PAKDD 2009 Competition whose 
focus was on this type of degradation. Task 2 represents an innovation in data 
mining competitions worldwide by emphasizing the quality of future 
delinquency estimation instead of the usual lowest future average 
delinquency.  
We have built an integrated solution to deal with these two tasks. First we 
developed a credit scoring using a set of supervised learning methods. Then 
we calibrated the output, based on a projection of the evolution in the default. 
This forecast considered both the evolution of default and the evolution of 
exogenous data series, echoing potential changes in the population of the 
model, in the economy, or in the market. In so doing, resulting adjusted scores 
translate a combination of the customers’ specific risk with systemic risk. As 
in many other applied financial studies, this research is bounded by some 
practical limitations, like systematic noise in the data and short time series. 
Our view is that the choice of the most appropriate methods for developing a 
credit scoring is context specific, and therefore, we present a technical 
approach driven by the specifics of the problem. We have also taken in 
consideration the extent of meaningful and reliable data that is actually 
available for modelling.  
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4.3. Database and development environment 
 
The research summarized in this chapter was conducted in a real-life financial 
dataset, comprising 762,966 applications of credit cards, from a financial 
institution in Brazil. Data for modelling was provided along two years of 
operation, from 2009 to 2010. Each customer in the modelling dataset is 
assigned to a delinquency outcome - good or bad. In this problem, a person is 
assigned to the bad class if she had a payment in delay for 60 or more days, 
along the first year after the credit has been granted. The delinquency rate in 
the modelling dataset is 27.3%. Two additional datasets from the next year, 
2011, were used to test the performance achieved in the static modelling 
sample, namely the leaderboard and the prediction dataset. The leaderboard 
contains a sample of 60,000 records that were obtained aggregating 
subsamples of 5,000 applications of each month in 2011. Although the default 
outcome was not available in the leaderboard dataset, the discriminatory 
power of the model given by the receiver operating characteristic curve 
(AUC) could be measured during the modelling stage. Competitors were 
allowed to make submissions of their solutions in the leaderboard, and for 
each the AUC and the distance D were measured online. The prediction 
dataset was used for the final performance evaluation in the competition. This 
dataset has 444,828 applications in 2011, for which the default outcome was 
not available at any stage of the modelling. A summary of the files is 
presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Case study Brazil - dataset summary. 
Dataset Records Period Target Delinquency (%) 
Modelling 762,966 2009-2010 Labelled 0.273 
Leaderbord 60,000 2011 Unlabelled Unknown 
Prediction 444,828 2011 Unlabelled Unknown 
 
The full list of variables in the original dataset was downloaded from the 
BRICS 2013 official website. The dataset contains 39 variables, summarized 
in Table 4.2 and one binary target variable with values 1 identifying a record 
in the bad class and 0 for the good class.  
Table 4.2: Case study Brazil - variables summary. 
Type # Information 
Numerical 6 Age, monthly income, time at current address, time at current 
employer, number of dependents, and number of accounts in 
the bank. 
Treated as 
nominal 
13 Credit card bills due date, 1st to 4th zip digit codes, home (state, 
city, and neighbourhood), marital status, income proof type, 
long distance dialling code, occupation code, and type of home. 
Binary 16 Address type proof, information of the mother and father’s 
names, input from credit bureau, phone number, bills at the 
home address, previous credit experience, other credit cards, 
tax payer and national id, messaging phone number, immediate 
purchase, overdraft protection agreement, lives and work in the 
same state, lives and work in the same city, and gender. 
Date 1 Application date.  
ID 3 Customer, personal reference, and branch unique identifiers. 
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4.4. Methodology and theoretical framework 
 
This research evolves from a one-dimensional analysis, where we come 
across the financial outlook underlying the problem, to a multidimensional 
approach, where we gradually develop and experiment a new framework to 
model credit risk. The one-dimensional analysis was tailored to gain intuition 
on the default predictors and the main factors ruling the dynamics of default. 
The multidimensional approach is at the core of the work presented in this 
chapter and was held in two stages. In the first stage we developed a credit 
scoring model from a classical framework, with a static learning setting and 
binary output. In the second stage, we used a linear regression between 
exogenous data (fully listed in Table 4.4) and the internal default for adjusting 
the predictions.  
In the first stage, we used the exogenous data series disclosed by the Central 
Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil, 2011) and the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics2 to evaluate the effect of time changing economics 
in the default evolution. We used quarterly series available from January 2004 
through December 2011. Nevertheless, for determining the fitting between 
them and the internal default, only the period 2009 to 2010 was considered. 
We used the coefficient of determination, r-square, to evaluate the quality of 
fitting between the exogenous series and the default in the analysed portfolio, 
in a one-dimensional basis. 
 
                                                          
2 Source: www.tradingeconomics.com. 
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4.4.1. Data analysis, cleansing and new characteristics 
 
Some important aspects of the datasets were considered, because they can 
influence the performance in the unlabelled datasets. These aspects regard to: 
Great extent of zero or missing values – In exception to the variables ‘lives 
and works in the same state’ and ‘previous credit experience’, binary fields 
have 95% to 100% concentrated in one of the values, which turn them 
practically unworkable. The same occurs for the numerical variables ‘number 
of dependents’ and ‘number of accounts in the bank’, both with more than 
99% of zeroes. The remaining variables were reasonably or completely 
populated. 
Outliers and unreasonable values – The variable age present 0.05% of 
applications assigned to customers with ages between 100 and 988 years.  A 
small proportion of values out of the standard ranges are observable in the 
variables credit card bills due day, monthly income and time at current 
employer. 
Unreliable and informal information – low reliability on socio-demographic 
data is amplified by specific conditions in the background of this problem. 
This type of scorecards is usually based in verbal information that the 
customer provides, and in most of the cases no certification is made available. 
In 85% of the applications, no certification for the income was provided, and 
75% do not have proof for the address type. Customers have little or no 
concern to provide accurate information. The financial industry is aware of 
this kind of limitations. However, in highly competitive environments there 
is little chance to amend them, while staying in the business. Hence, other 
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than regulatory imperatives, no player is able to efficiently overcome data 
limitations. As currently there are no such imperatives in Brazilian financial 
market, databases attached to this type of models are expected to keep lacking 
from reliability in the near future. 
Shifts on the distributions of modelling examples – The most noticeable shift 
is in the variable monthly income. Values shift from one year to the other, 
which is an outcome of the increases in the minimum wages and in the 
inflation. During the analysed period, slight variations are also observable in 
the geographical variables, which are possibly related with the geographical 
expansion of the institution. In the remaining characteristics, the correlation 
between the frequency distributions of 2009 and 2010 range from 99% to 
100%, suggesting a very stable pattern during the analysed period. 
Data cleansing and new characteristics - We focused the data treatment on 
the characteristics that were reasonably or fully populated. Fields state, city, 
and neighbourhood contain free text, and were subjected to a manual 
cleansing. Classes with 100 or less records were assigned to a new class 
“Other”. We could observe that there may be neighbourhoods with the same 
name in different cities; and hence we concatenated these new cleansed fields 
into a new characteristic. Taking into account that the shift in the variable 
monthly may be related to an increase of the minimum wages and inflation, a 
new characteristic was calculated by multiplying the inflation rate in the year 
by the variable monthly income.  
Data transformation - Variables were transformed using the weights of 
evidence (WoE) in the complete modelling dataset, using the WoE 
WoEi = ln (
nGi nG⁄
nBi nB⁄
), (1)  
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where 𝑛𝐺𝑖  and 𝑛𝐵𝑖 are respectively the number of good and the number of 
bad in the bin i, and 𝑛𝐺  and 𝑛𝐵 are respectively the total number of good and 
bads in the population sample. The larger the WoE the higher is the proportion 
of good customers in the bin.  Numerical variables were firstly binned using 
SAS Enterprise Miner, and then manually adjusted to reflect the domain 
knowledge. In so doing we aim to achieve a set of characteristics less exposed 
to overfitting. Cases where the calculation of the WoE rendered impossible - 
one of the classes without examples - were given an average value. The same 
principle was applied to values out of the expected ranges (e.g. credit card 
bills due day higher than 31).  
One-dimensional analysis - The strength of each potential characteristic is 
measured using the information value (IV) in the training dataset              
IV = ∑( nGi nG⁄ − nBi nB⁄ )WoEi
n
i=1
, (2)  
where n is the number of bins in the characteristic. The higher the IV is, the 
higher is the relative importance of the characteristic in a univariate basis. 
The higher is the IV the higher is the relative importance of the characteristic. 
In a one-dimensional basis, the most important characteristics are age, 
occupation, time at current employer, monthly income and marital status, 
with information values of 0.368, 0.352, 0.132, 0.117, and 0.116, 
respectively. Remaining characteristics have 0.084 or less.  
Interaction terms - Using the odds in each attribute of the variables, we 
calculated new nonlinear characteristics using interaction terms between 
variables to model the joint effects. We tested six combinations, for which we 
present the IV in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Case study Brazil - interaction terms information value. 
Combination IV 
Age ∗ Income 0.315 
Age ∗ Occupation 0.009 
Income ∗ Marital status 0.208 
Income ∗ Occupation 0.334 
Income ∗ Proof of income 0.123 
Age ∗ Income ∗ Occupation 0.007 
 
4.4.2. Modelling changing environment and time series analysis 
 
The methodology presented in this chapter aims to propose an innovation in 
credit scoring modelling, by fitting the delinquency estimated with a 
scorecard, based on the movement of specific factors in the financial and 
economic environments. We based our empirical study in the analysis of 
exogenous time series, described in Table 4.4. Among the exogenous series 
that are available, we expect that this set includes the exogenous factors that 
have a major influence in the behaviour of the individuals and in credit cards 
repayments or delinquencies, by consequence. 
  
 74 
 
Table 4.4: Case study Brazil - exogenous data series. 
Series Correla r-square 
Default on the financial revenue in credit cards in the countryb 0.805 0.648 
Default in revolving credit in the countryb 0.491 0.241 
GDP -0.168 0.028 
GDP annual variation 0.485 0.236 
Primary income payments (BoP, current US$) 0.787 0.619 
Lending interest rate (%) 0.118 0.014 
Real interest rate (%) -0.047 0.002 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue) -0.256 0.065 
Household final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) -0.713 0.509 
Private consumption -0.365 0.133 
Inflation rate 0.797 0.635 
Unemployment rate -0.100 0.010 
Consumer confidence -0.280 0.080 
Wages 0.381 0.145 
a. Correlation between the portfolio defaults rates series and the exogenous data series, from 2009 to 2010. 
b. An abnormal observation was recorded in the first quarter of 2011. As we could not confirm the reliability of this 
value, we have chosen to replace it by the average of the adjacent quarters.  
 
As most of the available exogenous data series are quarterly updated, we 
considered quarterly observations for all series. Although exogenous data 
series are available from 2004 onwards, we could not make a full use of them, 
because the internal data was only available for 2009 and 2010. Hence, we 
focused the analysis on that period, which may be considered short for 
achieving a fully reliable forecast. A minimum of 5 years is required with 
Basel II. In this type of analysis, it would be appropriate using a much larger 
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historical period, to capture different phases of one or more economic cycles3. 
However, as the competition associated with this study aimed at an accurate 
1-year forecast, our assumption was to consider that in 2011, Brazil would be 
in the same phase of the economic cycle as in the previous years - 2009 and 
2010.  
The internal default series follow very different paths in 2009 and 2010, Fig. 
4.1, which discourages any attempt to discern an intra-annual seasonality. 
Nevertheless, in both years, the default slightly increased along the second 
semester. Although this is not a definite conclusion, we considered this 
occurrence in the forecasting scenarios, as we will describe hereafter. 
 
Fig. 4.1: Case study Brazil - internal default by month in 2009 and 2010. 
 
In order to find potential relations between the internal default and the 
exogenous series, we calculated their correlations, Table 4.4. For the analysed 
period, the best series are the default on the financial revenues of credit cards 
in Brazil, primary income payments, households’ final consumption 
                                                          
3 An economic cycle may last for decades. Identifying an economic cycle is an important and 
non-trivial task that will be no further analysed here, as it goes far beyond the scope of this 
work. 
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expenditure, and the inflation rate. As only 8 observations are available, linear 
regression should consider a single independent variable, aiming to avoid 
overfitting. In forecasting scenarios, we only considered the series with the 
highest correlation - default on the financial revenues of credit cards in Brazil. 
Notwithstanding, an r-square of 64% in the regression can be considered low 
for the regression. We tested three forecasting scenarios, summarized in Table 
4.5, which were iteratively submitted to the leaderboard. The final prediction 
is based on the scenario with the lowest distance D in the leaderboard. 
 
Table 4.5: Case study Brazil - forecasting scenarios tested in task 2. 
# Description Rational 
1 Estimate the default in each quarter 
adaptively from the values of 
default in credit cards of the 
previous quarter, and submit 
calculated values.  
Incorporate new information adaptively, 
when it is available. This may benefit from 
the drift detection and suggest implementing 
corrective actions. 
2 Estimate the default in each quarter 
adaptively from the values of 
default in credit cards of the 
previous quarter, and submit the 
average. 
As there is no knowledge about the economic 
cycle, any correction resulting from a drift 
between quarters may be less apropriate in 
this application. It may be preferrable to use a 
central tendency of default (e.g.average 
defaults). 
3 Submit the average annual default 
until September, and the average 
increased by 1% in the last two 
months of the year.  
Use central tendency of default and adjust the 
months were the direction of the drift is more 
certain. 
 
 
  
 77 
 
4.5. Two-stage model 
 
Some previous research suggests including economic conditions directly into 
a regression scorecard (Zandi, 1998), survival analysis (Bellotti and Crook, 
2009), or transition models (Malik and Thomas, 2012). Our approach was to 
use a two-stage modelling framework in order to keep separate the two 
dimensions of risk – specific and systemic. The specific risk should be 
captured from the bank internal database with the scorecard developed in the 
first stage, and the movement of systemic risk is calculated with a linear 
regression at a second stage. The final score is therefore an adjustment of the 
initial score by the expected variation of the default in the population of the 
model.  
 
4.5.1. Credit scoring construction 
 
Several standard classification models, based on logistic regression (LR), 
AdaBoost, and Generalized Additive Models (GAM) were designed and 
tested with a 10 fold crossed-validation. Characteristics were iteratively 
added to the models, until no performance gain was observed in the test. Four 
different strategies were gauged, varying the window, and eliminating noise 
from the input dataset: 
High volume and diversity - Use the entire modelling dataset (2009-
2010), for more volume and diversity. 
Through-the-door - Use the sample closest to the through-the-door 
population, for mitigating the effects of the temporal bias. We tested 
two different windows: 2010 full year, and 2010 last quarter. 
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Ensemble of 12 models - Create a model to apply in each month of the 
year, using the corresponding months in 2009 and 2011. Our idea is to 
address the changes in demand that may be attached to seasonal effects. 
Twelve models were developed, and their results were combined in the 
final score. 
Cleaning - To overcome the presence of noise in the data, create a 
model using the entire modelling dataset (2009-2010); since the 
presence of noise in the data can spoil the model, we removed the 
examples strongly misclassified, and retrained the model in the reduced 
set. We consider an example strongly misclassified if the predicted 
posterior probability of the true class is less than 0.05.  
As the financial institution is expanding, the leaderboard and the prediction 
sets should contain new codes in the discrete variables (e.g. new branch and 
geographical codes). These cases cannot be trained from the modelling 
dataset, because they cannot be observed before the expansion. As there was 
no knowledge about the nature and strategy of the expansion, we opted to 
assign an educated guess - use the average partial score for unfamiliar codes. 
In real-word environments, this assignment can be better guided, because the 
expansion strategy is known in advance. 
  
4.5.2. Introducing the effect of time changing environment 
 
In the second stage of modelling we introduced the effect of time changing 
environment into the scorecard previously developed. The initial predictions 
of the scorecard were shifted according to a factor of the expected variation 
of default. Every cut-off point set between 0 and 1 is converted into a new 
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adjusted default rate within the set of approved applications, as illustrated in 
Fig. 4.2.  
 
Fig. 4.2: Case study Brazil – model adjustment with the default central tendency. 
 
4.6. Results 
 
Task 1 - Only the models with the best results in the test set were submitted 
to the leaderboard. Table 4.6 shows the results for the best models in the 
modelling dataset. Although a broad number of different configurations were 
tested, we only present the results for the models with an AUC higher than 
0.71 in the test set. This includes the models that were also submitted to the 
leaderboard. 
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Table 4.6: Case study Brazil - best models in task 1, AUC>0.71 in the test set. 
Method Period Test Leaderboarda 
GAM 2009-10 0.7320 0.7227 
GAM 2010 0.7140 0.7131 
GAM 2010(Q4) 0.7204 n.a. 
LR 2009-10 0.7222 n.a. 
LR with cleaning 2009-10 0.7222 n.a. 
LR monthly 
2009-10, month 
against month 
0.7230 0.7140 
AdaBoost 2009-10 0.7180 n.a. 
a. n.a. - not available, because the model was not submitted to the leaderboard. 
 
The model with the best results in the leaderboard is based on the Generalized 
Additive Model, and using the entire modelling dataset (2009 and 2010). This 
model was also submitted in the final prediction of the competition. Although 
we have tested different timeframes when modelling, it became apparent that 
for this application, the model with best performance was achieved with the 
larger volume of examples and diversity. The degradation of the proposed 
scorecard from the test (2009-2010) to the leaderboard (2011) is of 0.93%, 
which is quite acceptable in similar real-world applications. The degradation 
was partly controlled by adjusting unstable variables (e.g. monthly income 
based on the inflation rate). Apart from these, the bulk of remaining the 
characteristics is quite stable over time. 
Task 2 – The results of this task, presented in Table 4.7, demonstrate that 
when the forecast depend on very short time series, the best fitting is achieved 
with the simplest adjustment – the central tendency of default. In this 
problem, submitting an average default enhanced the fitting of default 
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(scenario 2), which was further improved by adjusting on the months where 
the direction of the drift is more certain (scenario 3). 
Table 4.7: Case study Brazil - results in task 2. 
Scenario 
(#) 
Average default 
rate 
Distance D 
1 0.293 3.16 
2 0.293 1.45 
3 0.294 0.83 
a. Annual average forecasted default rate in 2011, if the entire portfolio is approved. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 
Theoretical models for knowledge extraction from data streams seem suitable 
for dealing with temporal degradation of credit scoring models. The idea is to 
use adaptive models, incorporating new information when it is available. 
Integrating new information may also benefit from the drift detection, and the 
occurrence of a drift may suggest eventual corrective actions to the model. 
Some specifics of the financial problems may turn the models quite stable 
along time, which is the case of the scorecard presented in this research. A 
static learning setting was at the basis of the model with the best 
discriminatory power. It also becomes apparent that some sort of time 
discretization may turn useless in some applications and may lead to nonsense 
or suboptimal forecasts. In this problem, as there is not an intra-annual 
seasonality of default, the practical meaning of a monthly prediction is may 
be debatable. Credit risk assessment is one area where the data mining and 
forecasting tools have largely expanded over the last years. However, there 
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are a few areas where the use of these tools should focus essentially on 
providing a direction, rather than providing a strict prediction. There are a 
number of possible directions that no model that looks just into the past can 
enlighten about the future. This includes the directions driven by the business 
strategy of the bank (e.g. expanding the branch network, to offer a new 
product, or to merge with another financial institution). The same applies to 
the occurrence of extreme or rare events, like those that were roused by the 
recent financial crisis. The new paradigm of forecasting turns out to be 
looking at hidden streams in the present signal and understand how they will 
possibly direct an event into the future. 
We propose a two-stage model for dealing with temporal degradation of 
credit scoring, which provided good results in a 1-year timeframe. However, 
it should also have a good performance in the long run. Therefore, future 
applications of this modelling framework should be tested in larger 
timeframes and consider lagged periods. Stress-testing this methodology 
should consider environments under major macroeconomic distress, or 
drifting populations resulting from expressive growth in the portfolios. 
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5. A new dynamic modelling framework for 
credit risk assessment 
 
 
Abstract - In this chapter we investigate the two mechanisms of memory, 
short-term (STM) and long-term memory (LTM), in the context of credit risk 
assessment. These components are fundamental to learning but are 
overlooked in credit risk modelling frameworks. As a consequence, current 
models are insensitive to changes, such as population drifts or periods of 
financial distress. We extend beyond the typical development of credit score 
modelling based in static learning settings to the use of dynamic learning 
frameworks. Exploring different amounts of memory enables a better 
adaptation of the model to the current states. This is particularly relevant 
during shocks, when limited memory is required for a rapid adjustment. At 
other times, a long memory is favoured. An empirical study relying on the 
Freddie Mac’s database, with 16.7 million mortgage loans granted in the U.S. 
from 1999 to 2013, suggests using a dynamic modelling of STM and LTM 
components to optimize current rating frameworks. 
 
 
Parts of this chapter are published in the Journal of Expert Systems with Applications in the 
paper titled “A new dynamic modeling framework for credit risk assessment”. ISSN: 0957-
4174; DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.09.055.  
A paper describing an application of the previous methodology to the Freddie Mac’s loans 
database was submitted to the Journal of Risk Model Validation with the title “Dynamic 
credit score modelling with short-term and long-term memories: the case of Freddie Mac’s 
database”, and is under review. 
Some sections are repeated through the dissertation to make the chapters self-contained. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
More than half a century has passed since credit scoring models have been 
introduced to credit risk assessment and corporate bankruptcy prediction 
(Harold Bierman and Hausman, 1970, Altman, 1968, Smith, 1964, Myers and 
Forgy, 1963). With today’s advanced economies, a high proportion of the 
loan applications are automatically decided upon using frameworks where the 
credit score is the central, if not the unique, indicator of the borrowers’ credit 
risk. In the United States (U.S.), the FICO score is an industry standard, 
claimed to be used in 90% of lending decisions, to determine how much 
money each individual can borrow and to set the interest rate for each loan. 
In the OECD countries, banks that have adopted the Internal Ratings Based 
(IRB) approach, in Basel II Accord (Bank for International Settlements, 2006, 
Bank for International Settlements, 2004), are using their own credit scoring 
models as the basis of the regulatory capital calculation. 
A credit scoring model is meant to be an intelligent system. The output is a 
prediction about a given entity defaulting in a future period. In practice, one 
often uses a score that varies linearly in a positive range (e.g. FICO score 
varies in the range 300-850). In this arena, many frameworks, adaptations to 
real-life problems, and intertwining of base algorithms were, and continue to 
be, proposed in the literature, ranging from statistical approaches, to state-of-
the-art machine learning algorithms, from parametric models to non-
parametric procedures, see the papers of Jones et al. (2015) and Orth (2013). 
Typical credit scoring systems are developed from static datasets. Subject to 
context specifics, and provided that certain requirements of the methods are 
met, a timeframe for the development is delimited at some point in the past. 
By referring to historical examples within such a timeframe, the model is 
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designed using a supervised learning approach. The resulting model is then 
used, possibly for several years, without further adaptation. As a 
consequence, traditional static credit scoring models are quite insensitive to 
changes within financial environments, like gradual or abrupt population 
changes caused by hidden transformations, or disturbances in periods of 
major financial distress. In line with this idea, Amato and Furnine (2004) 
found that ratings do not generally exhibit sensitivity to the business cycle.  
To some extent, credit scoring models development still need to better mimic 
the human learning established on experience. There are two basic 
mechanisms of memory, short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory 
(LTM), which are fundamental components of human experience and 
cognition. The former is easy to set up but readily forgotten; the latter may 
take longer to set up but tends to be more durable (Baddeley, 2012). The aim 
of this study is to find a clearer understanding of which type of memory 
configuration for the learning of credit scoring systems enables a rapid 
adaptation to changes. Hence, our analysis is set on two research questions: 
Is recent information relevant for improving forecasting accuracy? Does older 
information always improve forecasting accuracy? 
Consumers’ behaviour and default change over time in unpredictable ways. 
There are several types of evolution inside a population, for example 
population changes, that translate into changes in the distributions of the 
variables, affecting the models. The behaviour of the individuals and their 
ability to repay their debts change when the conditions within the economic 
cycle evolve. In good times, banks and borrowers tend to be overoptimistic 
about the future, whilst in times of recession banks are swamped with 
defaulted loans, high provisions, and tightened capital buffers. The former 
leads to more liberal credit policies and lower credit standards, the latter 
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promote sudden credit-cuts. Empirical evidence and theoretical frameworks 
support a positive, and lagged relationship between rapid credit growth and 
loan losses (Sousa et al., 2015a).  
In order to adapt the models’ output to changes over time, institutions should 
calibrate their scoring models according to the most recent information. There 
is a new emphasis on running predictive models with the ability of sensing 
themselves and learning adaptively (Gama et al., 2014). Advances on the 
concepts for knowledge discovery from data streams suggest new 
perspectives to identify, understand and efficiently manage dynamics of 
behaviour in consumer credit in changing environments. In a world where 
events are not preordained and little is certain, what we do in the present 
affects how events unfold, and they may do so in unexpected ways. New 
concepts for adapting to change and modelling the dynamics in populations 
have been proposed in credit score modelling (Adams et al., 2010, Pavlidis et 
al., 2012, Sousa et al., 2013). In this research, we apply a dynamic modelling 
framework for credit risk assessment, consisting of a sequential learning of 
the incoming new data. The driving idea mimics the principle of films, by 
composing the model from a sequence of snapshots rather than a single 
photograph. Two memory configurations are used: a STM and a LTM. The 
framework implements a component for adapting to drift, which is motivated 
by the original ideas of Widmer and Kubat (1996) and Klinkenberg (2004). 
The projected modelling framework is able to produce robust predictions not 
only in stable conditions but also in the presence of changes. 
Renewed empirical credit risk measures are presented in this research using 
the Freddie Mac’s single family mortgage loan-level database, first released 
in 2013. The database covers 16.7 million of fully amortized, 30-year fixed-
rate mortgages, originated in the U.S. between 1999 and the first quarter of 
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2013. Based on historically observed delinquencies, the performance of the 
adaptive modelling is assessed in each memory configuration, and for a 
baseline static model developed with the data of the beginning of the period. 
We show that existing frameworks could be largely improved by including 
adaptive learning techniques. In such a setting, insight is provided into a 
multicomponent memory approach, consisting of a model combining a 
durable LTM component together with a temporary component, like STM 
(that in an extreme case can work as an episodic memory).  
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the work most similar to ours is by 
Pavidlis, Tasoulis, Adams and Hand (2012) where an adaptive online 
algorithm is used in the classification of credit applications. It is based on the 
formulation of a criterion that enables a classifier to adapt to changes without 
completely disregarding all previous information. In the presence of 
population drift it is assumed that recent examples are more representative of 
the current classification than others in the distant past. Assorted experiments 
in artificial datasets exhibiting drift suggest that the method has the potential 
to yield significant performance improvement over standard approaches. 
However, an application of the method to a real-world dataset consisting of 
92,258 UPL applications accepted between 1st January 1993 and 30th 
November 1997 in the United Kingdom, revealed that the model was unable 
to outperform a static classifier built with the data from the beginning of the 
period, 1993. The authors provide insufficient comments regarding this 
finding, regardless of the existence of population drift in the dataset, which 
had been documented in a previous study of Kelly, Hand and Adams (1999). 
Our research is the first to document the dominance of the adaptive over static 
modelling frameworks in a real-world relevant financial dataset, the Freddie 
Mac’s database. 
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5.1.1. How does the industry currently handle credit scoring model 
maintenance? 
 
Developing and implementing a credit scoring model can be time and 
resource consuming, easily taking from 9 to 18 months, from data extraction 
up to deployment. Not infrequently, banks use unchanged credit scoring 
models for several years. If conditions remain unchanged, then this does not 
significantly affect the accuracy of the models. Otherwise, the models’ 
performance can greatly deteriorate over time. The recent financial crisis has 
drawn attention to models built on outdated timeframes. During the crisis, 
many financial institutions were using stale credit scoring models built with 
historical data from the first half of the decade; and many did not change their 
models in the aftermath of the crisis. The statistical deficiencies and 
degradation of stationary credit scoring models are issues widely documented 
in early literature (Eisenbeis, 1978) and backed up by empirical evidence 
(Sousa et al., 2015a, Rajan et al., 2015, Lucas, 2004, Avery et al., 2004).  
Before the IRB approach had been introduced in the Basel II Accord, the 
financial industry had been less motivated to rebuild credit scoring models. 
At the time, financial institutions often outsourced model development to 
external parties, while assigning some internal staff to these activities. 
Changes to the models were rare, because they were expensive and time-
consuming. Currently, many of the banks using the IRB approach have 
internalized this activity, because they are required to closely monitor the 
performance of the models and suitably respond to changes. Not infrequently, 
this requires multiple local adjustments to the models to improve their 
accuracy, which may be as costly and time-consuming as developing a new 
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model. The European Banking Authority reports that models’ adjustment or 
calibration has not a common practice amongst regulators. Many countries do 
not define any specific rules and when they do, these are usually not made 
public. Moreover, different countries favour different calibration choices 
(EBA, 2013b).  
The huge advances in processing power and in storage capacity, together with 
the progress in streaming analytics, suggest increased practicality of adaptive 
modelling frameworks. However, some regulators are unlikely to approve 
models that change over time. So, under current circumstances, banks are 
likely to keep using a model as long as possible without further adaptation. 
This can be worrying, especially if the models’ performance significantly 
declines during shocks. The impact of such degradation might be amplified 
because of other risk parameters, such as Loss Given Default (LGD), rising 
sharply, which pushes up the costs for misclassification errors. An insight into 
this effect is provided in a recent study of Sousa, Gama, and Brandão (2015b), 
where the disturbances in the return on lending in different scenarios of LGD, 
and of the default rates until maturity are measured. 
This research provides new evidence on the significant degradation of credit 
scoring models based on static learning, broadly used among academics and 
practitioners. It is hoped that this research will provide useful guidance for 
future regulation in retail banking. 
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5.1.2. Structure of the chapter 
 
Section 5.2 will provide a brief description of the settings and concepts of the 
supervised learning problem and score formulation. It will also present the 
fundamental ideas of adaptive learning. In section 5.3, we will present the 
conditions behind our case study, by providing an overview of Freddie Mac’s 
database and the main dynamics over the period 1999-2013(Q1). Section 5.4 
will present the adaptive modelling framework used in our experimental 
design. In section 5.5, we will compare the performance of the adaptive 
learning procedures with a baseline static model, and will compare the results 
of the STM with the LTM configuration. We draw conclusions in section 5.6. 
 
5.2. Methods for adaptation 
 
Traditional methods for building a credit scoring model consider a static 
learning setting. The model is trained using a predefined sample of past 
examples and then used to score new examples; actual or potential borrowers 
in the future. This is an offline learning procedure, because the whole training 
dataset must be available when the model is built. The model can be used for 
prediction only after having completed the training, and it will not be re-
trained while in use, possibly for years, independently of changes in the 
surrounding environment. Alternatively, one might build a model that is 
updated continuously by incoming data. 
The question remains whether it is best to have a long-term memory or to 
forget past events. On the one hand, a LTM might be desirable because it 
enhances the space of observed configurations. On the other hand, many of 
those configurations may no longer be relevant to the current situation. A 
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rapid adaptation to change is achieved within a short window, because it 
reflects the current situation more accurately. However, the performance of 
models built upon shorter windows might decline in stable periods. In credit 
score modelling, this has been indirectly discussed by practitioners and 
researchers when trying to understand the pros and cons of using a through-
the-cycle (TTC) or point-in-time (PIT) scheme to calibrate the output of the 
scorecards to the current phase of the economic cycle. For years a PIT scheme 
was the only option, because banks had insufficient data. Since the 
implementation of the Basel II Accord, banks are required to store the default 
data for a minimum of 7 years and consider a minimum of 5 years for 
calibrating the scorecards.  
One of the most intuitive ideas to adjust to changes is to keep rebuilding the 
model from a window that moves over the latest batches and use this model 
for predicting on the immediate future. This idea assumes that the latest 
instances are the most relevant for prediction and that they contain the 
information of the current situation (Klinkenberg, 2004). The accumulation 
of batches of data, for example, annually, monthly, or daily, generates a flow 
of data for dynamic modelling.  
An original idea of Widmer and Kubat (1996) uses a sliding window of fixed 
length with a first-in-first-out (FIFO) data processing structure. Each window 
may consist of a single batch or multiple sequential batches, instead of single 
instances. At each new time step, the model is updated in two stages. In the 
first stage, the model is rebuilt based on the training dataset of the most recent 
window. In the second stage, a forgetting process discards the data that moves 
out of the fixed-length window. Incremental algorithms (Widmer and Kubat, 
1996) are a less extreme hybrid approach that allows for updating the models 
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to the new context. They are able to process examples batch-by-batch, or one-
by-one, and update the prediction model after each batch, or after each 
example. Incremental models may rely on random previous examples, or on 
representative selected sets of examples, called incremental algorithms with 
partial memory (Maloof and Michalski, 2004). The challenge is to select an 
appropriate window size.  
 
5.3. Case study 
 
Our research was conducted using the Freddie Mac’s single family mortgage 
loan-level database, first published in March 2013. It tracks the performance 
of 16.7 million of fully amortized 30-year fixed-rate mortgages loans in the 
U.S., granted between January 1st 1999 and March 31st 2013. Sharing this data 
follows the direction of the regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), as part of a larger effort to increase transparency and promote risk 
sharing. The primary goal of making this data available was to help investors 
build more accurate credit performance models in support of the risk sharing 
initiatives highlighted by the FHFA in the 2013 conservatorship scorecard. 
The dataset is live data updated over time, typically at the end of each quarter, 
with the application and performance data being summarized by month, from 
the application point until the most recent reporting period.  
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5.3.1. Origination data 
 
We considered a set of 16 variables that were available to the lenders at the 
time of the mortgage being granted, see Table 5.1. The release changes of the 
database are published online alongside a general user guide describing the 
full file layout and data dictionary (Freddie Mac, June 2013b). Freddie Mac’s 
information regarding the key loan attributes and performance metrics can be 
linked to our research in the aggregated summary statistics (Freddie Mac, June 
2014b).  
Table 5.1: Case study U.S. - data available to the lenders at the loan application. 
Name Short description Type 
Credit score A number summarizing the borrower’s creditworthiness at 
the time of the origination date. 
Numeric 
First 
homebuyer 
flag 
Indicates whether the borrower is a first-time home buyer. Binary 
Metropolitan 
area  
Identified with the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or 
metropolitan division (MD) based on census data.  
Treated as 
categorical 
Mortgage 
insurance 
percentage  
(MI%) 
The percentage of loss coverage that a mortgage insurer is 
providing to cover losses incurred as a result of a default 
on the loan, at the time of Freddie Mac’s purchase.  
For insured loans, the MI may vary between 1% and 55%.  
Numeric 
Number of 
units 
Denotes whether the mortgage is a one-, two-, three-, or 
four-unit property. 
Numeric 
Occupancy 
status 
Denotes whether the mortgage type is owner occupied, 
second home, or investment property. 
Categorical 
Original loan 
to value 
(LTV) 
Original mortgage loan amount divided by the lesser of the 
mortgaged property’s appraised value on the note date or 
its purchase price (in case of purchase or refinance 
mortgages). 
Numeric 
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Name Short description Type 
Ratios falling outside the range 6% and 105%, are 
disclosed as unknown. 
Original debt 
to income 
(DTI) ratio 
Debt to income ratio is based on the following calculation: 
Debt: the sum of the borrower's monthly debt 
payments, including monthly housing expenses that 
incorporate the mortgage payment the borrower is 
making, divided by; 
Income: the total monthly income used to underwrite as 
of the date of the origination of the mortgage loan. 
Ratios greater than 65% or unknown are passed as null 
values. 
Note: The disclosure of the dataset is subject to the widely 
varying standards originators use to verify borrowers’ 
assets and liabilities.  
Numeric 
Original 
amount 
The UPB of the mortgage on the note date, rounded to the 
nearest $1,000. 
Numeric 
Origination 
channel 
Indicates whether the channel at the origination of the 
mortgage is a retail lender, a broker or a correspondent.  
Situations where a third party origination is applicable but 
the seller did not specify the broker or correspondent are 
distinguished in the dataset. 
Categorical 
Prepayment 
penalty 
mortgage 
(PPM) 
Indicates whether the mortgage is a PPM. A PPM is a 
mortgage with respect to which the borrower is, or at any 
time has been, obligated to pay a penalty in the event of 
certain repayments of principal. 
Binary 
Property state A code identifying the state or territory within which the 
property securing the mortgage is located. 
Categorical 
Property type Denotes whether the property type secured by the 
mortgage is a condominium, leasehold, planned unit 
development (PUD), cooperative share, manufactured 
home, or Single Family home. Situations where the 
property state is unknown can be recognized in the dataset. 
Categorical 
Postal code The postal code for the location of the mortgaged property. Treated as 
categorical 
Loan purpose Indicates whether the mortgage loan is a purchase 
mortgage, a cash-out refinance mortgage, or a no cash-out 
refinance mortgage. 
Categorical 
Number of 
borrowers 
Identifies whether there is a single borrower or more who 
are obligated to repay the mortgage note secured by the 
mortgaged property.  
Treated as 
categorical 
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5.3.2. Performance data 
 
Loan performance information is provided on a monthly basis and includes 
the monthly loan balance, delinquency status and information regarding early 
termination events: voluntary prepayments in full; 180 days delinquency 
(“D180”); repurchases prior to D180; third-party sales prior to D180; short 
sales prior to D180; deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure prior to D180; real estate 
owned (REO) acquisition prior to D180. Specific credit performance 
information in the dataset includes voluntary prepayments and loans that were 
short sales, deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, third party sales, and REOs. 
At the time of this research, data for performing loans and those that were up 
to 180 days delinquent was available through June 30th 2013. From the time 
it was granted until the most recent reporting period, there is a complete 
monthly historical report of the debt service for each loan, containing the 
following:   
Exposure at default value - ending balance as reported by the servicer for 
the corresponding monthly reporting period. 
Loan delinquency status - number of days that the borrower is delinquent, 
based on the due date of the last paid instalment reported by the servicers 
to Freddie Mac, calculated under the Mortgage Bankers Association 
(MBA) method. A code is used indicating the reason why the loan's 
balance was reduced to zero, in the following cases: 
- Prepaid or matured (voluntary payoff); 
- Foreclosed (short sale, third party sale, charge off or note sale); 
- Repurchased prior to property disposition, or; 
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- Real-estate owned (REO) disposition.  
We consider that a borrower defaulted if he was, at any point, 90 or more 
(90+) days delinquent, the typical definition used under Basel II. Later, in 
section 5.4, we will describe the construction of scorecards based on a 
supervised learning procedure and a binary target, where a borrower is 
assigned to the “bad” class, if he defaulted, and is assigned to the “good” class 
otherwise. 
 
5.4. Modelling framework 
 
5.4.1. Adaptive modelling 
 
The dynamic modelling framework implemented in this research considers 
that data is processed batch-by-batch, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Sequentially, 
every year, a new model is built from a previously selected window, including 
the most recent year. To have sufficient performance window length we chose 
not to use loans granted from 2012 onwards.  
In each model retraining - learning unit - we use a static setting. Each year, 
instances for modelling are selected from all previously available batches, 
according to a selection process. We use instance selection methods to test 
the hypothesis under investigation. Two methods were implemented – a LTM 
and a STM windowing configuration with a forgetting mechanism.  
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The LTM windowing configuration assumes that the learning algorithm 
generates the model based on all previous instances (Fig. 5.1(a)). The process 
is incremental, therefore every time a new instance arises, it is added to the 
training set, and a new model is built. This scheme should be appropriate to 
detect mild drifts, but it is unable to adapt rapidly to major changes. Models 
of this type should perform reasonably well in stable environments. A 
shortcoming of this incremental scheme is that the training dataset quickly 
expands, and this may require a huge storage capacity. In the STM windowing 
configuration, the model development uses the most recent window. With this 
scheme, Fig. 5.1(b), a new model is built in each new batch, by forgetting past 
examples. The fundamental assumption is that past examples have low 
correlation with the current default. Models of this type should quickly adapt 
to changes. A downfall of this method is that it often lacks the ability to 
generalize in stable conditions. 
 
(a) LTM. (b) STM. 
  
Fig. 5.1. Case study U.S. - adaptive learning windowing configurations.  
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5.4.2. Constructing the scorecards 
 
The classifier corresponding to each learning unit is a scorecard. Generalized 
Additive Models (GAM), introduced by Hastie and Tibshirani, are an 
extension of Generalized Linear Models (GLM) which, in turn, are an 
extension of Linear Regression (LR). Scorecards are GAMs, where the 
individual functions are piece-wise constant. The general approach to 
scorecard development involves the binning of the predictive variables and 
the optimization of the weight of each binned characteristic (Silva and 
Cardoso, 2015). A common practice is to compute the weights in two steps. 
Firstly, for each characteristic, the relative importance (score) of each bin is 
estimated; then, the relative importance of each characteristic is optimized. A 
standard way to estimate the relative importance of each bin is by using the 
weight of evidence (WoE) in the complete training dataset 
WoEi = ln (
nGi nG⁄
nBi nB⁄
), (3)  
where 𝑛𝐺𝑖  and 𝑛𝐵𝑖 are respectively the number of non-defaulted borrowers 
(good class) in the bin i and the number of defaulted borrowers (bad class) in 
the bin i, and 𝑛𝐺  and 𝑛𝐵 are respectively the total number of non-defaulted 
borrowers and total number of defaulted borrowers in the population sample. 
The larger the WoE is, the higher is the proportion of good borrowers in the 
bin. Numerical variables were firstly binned. Cases where the calculation of 
the WoE rendered impossible, i.e. no borrower following in one of the classes, 
are given an average value. The same rule is applied to values out of the 
expected ranges. The strength of each potential characteristic is measured 
using the information value (IV) in the training dataset                
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IV = ∑( nGi nG⁄ − nBi nB⁄ )WoEi
n
i=1
, (4)  
where n is the number of bins in the characteristic. The higher the IV is, the 
higher is the relative importance of the characteristic in a univariate basis. 
Finally, the design of the scorecard is concluded by optimizing the weight of 
each characteristic using a linear model, as described in Silva and Cardoso 
(2015). 
The scorecard design is wrapped in a forward feature selection process to find 
the optimal subset of characteristics. The selection process stops when no 
other characteristic adds significant contribution to the information value (IV) 
of the model. In this application the stopping criterion was set for a minimum 
increment of 0.03 in the IV. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the marginal contribution 
of the characteristics in each model adjustment, respectively, in the LTM and 
in the STM memory configurations. Cells are highlighted in grey if the 
characteristic was selected in the model adjustment. It’s worth noticing that, 
in the LTM configuration, the optimal subset of characteristics is more stable, 
and that the adjusted models tend to select a smaller number of characteristics. 
The STM configuration often leads to an adaptation based on a larger set of 
characteristics. 
For the conclusions drawn from the experimental design to have validity, the 
same design process, as well as the same set of 16 potential predictors, was 
used in the learning units of both memory configurations (LTM and STM). 
In so doing, the difference in the performance of the models should be only 
due to the different time windows lengths. 
  
 100 
 
Table 5.2: Case study U.S. - Marginal contribution in each LTM learning unit. 
Characteristic 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Credit score 1,238 1,325 1,393 1,586 1,586 1,527 1,502 1,459 1,307 1,220 1,288 1,317 1,335 
First homebuyer flag 0,000 0,001 0,006 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,003 0,003 
Metropolitan area 0,080 0,071 0,056 0,043 0,043 0,028 0,029 0,026 0,028 0,021 0,021 0,022 0,021 
Mortgage insurance 
percentage 
0,002 0,007 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 
Number of units 0,006 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,004 0,003 0,003 
Occupancy status 0,018 0,059 0,079 0,080 0,080 0,051 0,061 0,050 0,057 0,067 0,067 0,064 0,063 
Original debt to income 
(DTI) ratio 
0,051 0,016 0,020 0,014 0,014 0,022 0,021 0,024 0,039 0,069 0,077 0,084 0,088 
Original amount 0,100 0,026 0,013 0,027 0,027 0,044 0,025 0,021 0,011 0,005 0,005 0,005 0,005 
Original loan to value 
(LTV) 
0,159 0,130 0,203 0,245 0,245 0,264 0,236 0,226 0,247 0,259 0,261 0,258 0,259 
Origination channel 0,085 0,064 0,090 0,102 0,102 0,093 0,075 0,073 0,080 0,166 0,121 0,102 0,095 
Prepayment penalty 
mortgage 
0,005 0,003 0,006 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,006 0,005 0,003 0,013 0,019 0,021 0,024 
Property state 0,082 0,107 0,080 0,086 0,086 0,056 0,167 0,137 0,090 0,075 0,074 0,074 0,074 
Property type 0,025 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,029 0,000 0,024 0,000 0,018 0,019 0,019 
Postal code 0,039 0,064 0,029 0,022 0,022 0,019 0,017 0,018 0,016 0,016 0,018 0,018 0,019 
Loan purpose 0,021 0,017 0,017 0,000 0,000 0,013 0,011 0,012 0,022 0,014 0,015 0,015 0,017 
Number of borrowers 0,335 0,492 0,446 0,462 0,462 0,391 0,407 0,421 0,422 0,442 0,449 0,448 0,452 
Learning unit divergence 2,245 2,381 2,440 2,676 2,676 2,515 2,586 2,474 2,350 2,374 2,440 2,453 2,478 
              
Characteristics in the model 9 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 
 
Table 5.3: Case study U.S. - Marginal contribution in each STM learning unit. 
Characteristic 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Credit score 1,238 1,430 1,561 1,727 1,287 1,356 1,310 1,310 0,985 1,279 1,402 1,340 1,078 
First homebuyer flag 0,000 0,007 0,008 0,008 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,026 
Metropolitan area 0,080 0,022 0,046 0,046 0,072 0,070 0,088 0,088 0,029 0,025 0,207 0,254 0,365 
Mortgage insurance 
percentage 
0,002 0,258 0,289 0,289 0,003 0,000 0,003 0,003 0,001 0,004 0,000 0,024 0,000 
Number of units 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,008 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,000 0,000 
Occupancy status 0,018 0,062 0,113 0,113 0,000 0,004 0,011 0,011 0,049 0,090 0,017 0,003 0,002 
Original debt to income 
(DTI) ratio 
0,051 0,012 0,026 0,014 0,041 0,043 0,022 0,022 0,042 0,055 0,250 0,264 0,347 
Original amount 0,100 0,013 0,047 0,025 0,056 0,064 0,032 0,032 0,003 0,158 0,011 0,193 0,194 
Original loan to value 
(LTV) 
0,159 0,008 0,013 0,013 0,304 0,247 0,119 0,119 0,404 0,322 0,224 0,003 0,318 
Origination channel 0,085 0,085 0,174 0,174 0,072 0,040 0,015 0,015 0,076 0,058 0,043 0,020 0,015 
Prepayment penalty 
mortgage 
0,005 0,012 0,014 0,010 0,008 0,001 0,006 0,006 0,002 0,084 0,027 0,030 0,084 
Property state 0,082 0,080 0,173 0,173 0,062 0,286 0,308 0,308 0,240 0,234 0,195 0,363 0,411 
Property type 0,025 0,000 0,025 0,047 0,000 0,041 0,018 0,018 0,018 0,024 0,024 0,063 0,074 
Postal code 0,039 0,022 0,014 0,026 0,068 0,053 0,027 0,027 0,026 0,020 0,065 0,162 0,160 
Loan purpose 0,021 0,109 0,006 0,006 0,007 0,023 0,013 0,013 0,024 0,025 0,027 0,064 0,131 
Number of borrowers 0,335 0,427 0,448 0,448 0,372 0,334 0,948 0,948 0,327 0,423 0,308 0,357 0,466 
Learning unit divergence 2,2446 2,5486 2,9576 3,1196 2,3596 2,563 2,9224 2,9224 2,2312 2,8034 2,801 3,137
8 
3,670
5               
Characteristics in the model 9 7 8 8 9 10 6 6 7 9 8 10 11 
 
The performance of the model is measured with the Gini coefficient, 
equivalent to the area under the ROC curve (AUC). It refers to the global 
quality of the credit scoring model, and may range between -1 and 1. The 
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perfect scoring model fully distinguishes the two target classes, good and bad, 
and has a Gini index equal to 1. A model with a random output has a Gini 
coefficient equal to 0. If the coefficient is negative, then the scores have a 
reverse meaning. An extreme case of -1 would mean that all examples of the 
good class are being predicted as bad, and vice-versa. In this case, the perfect 
model can be achieved just by switching the prediction. 
 
5.5. Results 
 
We assessed the performance of the models sequentially learnt through the 
origination years 1999 to 2011. For each model rebuilding, the performance 
of the new model was measured in two sets: the modelling test set, containing 
a 20% random portion of the loans granted in the development year, and the 
set of loans granted in the following year, an out-of-sample performance.  
The vintage curves presented in a previous study of Landy, Ashworth and 
Yang (2014) suggest that the cumulative default rates of this portfolio reached 
a plateau by the fifth year. Since most of the default events occurred between 
the first and the fifth year after the loan had been granted, we assumed that 
the performance measures of the models should be calculated within this 
timeframe. Therefore, despite the fact that the models’ learning considered a 
fixed target concept - a borrower finding himself 90+ days delinquent at any 
point in a given timeframe after underwriting a loan -  performance was 
measured in five annually-incremental performance windows, from a 1-year 
to a 5-year performance window after the loan had been granted. In so doing, 
our aim is to bring awareness to the true performance of the models over the 
most relevant part of the life of the asset, rather than just interpreting the 1-
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year performance window, as conventional approaches do. The last 
origination year for the performance measurements varies according to the 
length of the performance window (e.g. for the loans underwritten in 2009, 
only a 4-year performance window can be measured until 2013, and for the 
loans underwritten in 2012, only a 1-year performance window can be 
measured until 2013). Hence, the 5-year performance window is measured 
until the origination year 2008, the 4-year performance window is measured 
until 2009, the 3-year performance window until 2010 and the 1 and 2-year 
performance windows until 2011. The 1-year performance window is not 
presented for the loans granted in 2012, since the performance of the loans 
granted in December could only be measured through a half-year 
performance window, and this was deemed insufficient. 
Below we will demonstrate the significant temporal degradation of static 
credit scoring in real-world environments, amplified during periods of major 
financial distress. Subsequently, we will present and discuss the results of the 
adaptive modelling framework, using the LTM and STM sliding-window 
configurations. 
 
5.5.1. Adaptive learning versus baseline static learning model 
 
 
A baseline static model was developed using the loans granted in the first year 
of the analysed period – 1999. This model was applied over the entire period, 
i.e. to each loan granted between 2000 and 2011, and the performance was 
assessed in each year, throughout the five performance windows. Results are 
presented in Fig. 5.2, where the performance of the adaptive learning models, 
in the STM and LTM configurations, is compared with the performance of 
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the baseline static model. For a more realistic view, the results of the adaptive 
learning procedure consider that a model is applied to the loans granted in the 
year after the year used to train the model. In fact, a 2-year minimum window 
should be used to achieve a 1-year performance window for all the 
observations. We have chosen not to apply this principle due to the fact that 
we would have to disregard the performance for the year 2000 - the beginning 
of the housing bubble - that we are interested in. Considering the huge volume 
of available data, the learning could be based on a smaller sample (e.g. using 
a quarter instead of an entire origination year), which would allow an earlier 
readjustment of the model. 
The performance of the baseline model gradually decreases over time, 
intuition also points to this. When compared with the adaptive learning 
procedure, the effectiveness of the performance decreases significantly from 
2007 onwards and most noticeably in the aftermath of the crisis, in 2009. This 
finding is consistent for every performance window length. 
 
 
(a) STM versus baseline. (b) LTM versus baseline. 
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(a) STM versus baseline. (b) LTM versus baseline. 
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Fig. 5.2. Case study U.S. - adaptive learning versus baseline static model. 
Model applied to the loans originated 1 year after the development.  
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5.5.2. Adaptive short-term memory versus adaptive long-term 
memory 
 
When comparing the performance of the short-term memory (STM) with the 
long-term memory (LTM) configuration in Fig. 5.3, we find that the STM 
configuration consistently outperforms the LTM. This finding is consistent 
both in the development test sample, referred to here as the development year, 
and in 1 year following the development. As it had been anticipated, the STM 
configuration consistently produced the highest performance during periods 
of exacerbated financial distress, from 2007 onwards. Even if we had 
speculated otherwise, the results of our analysis did not provide evidence that 
the LTM outperforms the STM in the analysed period. Our experimental 
design applies a LTM configuration that uses the longest available window 
until the point of relearning. However, this may not be sufficiently long to 
reveal a suitable range of memories and deliver dominant models in the LTM 
configuration. This is more likely to happen at the beginning of the period 
where the LTM configuration accumulates a few years’ worth of history. We 
also speculated that the memory used in the STM configuration might still be 
too long, and that STM performance could have been further improved if we 
had tried shorter-term configurations. However, it is worth noticing that 
smaller windows may find it harder to gain approval by the industry, 
especially considering cost, business and regulatory constraints.  
 106 
 
 (a) Development year (b)  1 year following the development 
1
-y
e
a
r 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 w
in
d
o
w
 
 
 
2
-y
e
a
rs
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 w
in
d
o
w
 
 
 
3
-y
e
a
rs
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 w
in
d
o
w
 
  
4
-y
e
a
rs
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 w
in
d
o
w
 
  
5
-y
e
a
rs
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 w
in
d
o
w
 
  
Fig. 5.3. Case study U.S. - performance of the adaptive learning. 
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5.6. Conclusions 
 
Credit risk assessment is one area where data mining and forecasting tools 
have largely expanded over the last few years. In the advanced economies, 
credit scoring models are central to credit decision-making frameworks and 
to the contemporary internal rating systems since the Basel II Accord has been 
issued and implemented. 
Typical credit scoring models are developed from static windows, and are 
therefore quite insensitive to changes, such as population changes or 
disturbances in periods of major financial distress. Theoretical models for 
knowledge extraction from data streams seem suitable for dealing with 
temporal degradation of credit scoring models. The idea is to use adaptive 
models, incorporating new information when it is available. Integrating new 
information may also benefit from detecting changes, and the occurrence of 
a change may point to eventual corrective actions applicable to the model. 
New concepts for adapting to changes have been proposed to deal with 
population drifts (Adams et al., 2010, Pavlidis et al., 2012, Sousa et al., 2013).   
In this research we employ an adaptive modelling framework that stands on 
the original designs of Widmer and Kubat (1996) and Klinkenberg (2004). 
We are motivated to understand how the two basic mechanisms of memory, 
STM and LTM, influence the models’ learning ability and predictive power 
through time. Central to our study is the idea that model learning is improved 
when mimicking human learning based on experience, and that STM and 
LTM are the driving components of that learning. 
We present the performance of two types of adaptive modelling frameworks, 
STM and LTM. They were trained from a real-world dataset of 16.7 million 
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loans that were at the epicentre of the global crisis, the Freddie Mac’s single 
family mortgage loan-level dataset, first published in 2013. We did not 
attempt to challenge the existing adaptive modelling techniques. Instead, we 
aimed at using a straightforward adaptive learning framework to explicitly 
exhibit the STM and LTM capabilities in model learning. Two plain 
assumptions are confirmed in our investigation: newest data consistently 
improves forecasting accuracy, and STM allows a quick adaptation to 
changes. Older information did not improve forecasting accuracy, but no 
general rule can be made, since it may be an outcome of the context specifics. 
Although we had assumed otherwise, our empirical study did not reveal that 
the LTM outperforms the STM during stable phases. We speculate that this 
may have been a consequence of having used an insufficiently short window 
in the STM configuration. Our research presents renewed relevant empirical 
evidence that traditional modelling frameworks significantly degrade over 
time and that the models’ predictive effectiveness is largely improved when 
adaptive learning frameworks are applied.  
There are some real business problems with rebuilding models over time. 
Firstly, lenders have little incentive to enhance the existing rating systems’ 
frameworks because it is expensive and time-consuming to build new 
scorecards. The scorecards need to be internally tested and validated, and then 
regulators need to approve them. Secondly, regulators still promote models 
whose coefficients do not change over time. This is one area where new 
evidence such as we have presented, might help. Our ideas for future work 
include trying to use ensembles of models that have been learnt from the past, 
instead of using the entire period to learn a new model. This has two major 
advantages. Firstly, a smaller sample is required for relearning the model, 
while still keeping memory from the past. Secondly, a model that depends on 
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the previous assessments is more palatable; hence, it is more likely to be 
accepted. Another viable option is to develop a straightforward mechanism 
for modelling the link between the two components of memory identified in 
this study – LTM and STM. Regarding the STM, a prior selection of the 
window length seems appropriate and should be employed to optimize 
adaptation ability. 
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6. Risk management with dynamic defaults 
and under the Basel capital rules 
 
 
Abstract - Stress-testing is an important risk management tool used by banks 
and supervisors. The recent deployment of large databases enables the 
realistic evaluation of financial models. We present a first application of 
Freddie Mac’s database recently released in 2013 to stress-testing, which can 
easily be replicated to other real-loans portfolios. Our proposal includes a first 
implementation of a return on risk-adjusted equity model embedded in the 
contemporary capital regulatory rules. Under this setting we analyse the 
impact of the Probability of Default (PD) and the Loss Given Default (LGD) 
in return on lending under the most extreme adverse circumstances. 
Subprime lending was mostly banned from the primary markets. We claim 
that this is an overreaction to the global financial crisis. We find that much of 
the disturbances in the return on lending only occur for high LGD values. For 
LGD below 25%, simulations show that lending to borrowers with lower 
scores produces positive returns in the long-run. If sufficiently mature, these 
loans can boost portfolios' compositions, because they are less exposed to 
early repayments. So, rather than strictly declining these loans, regulators and 
lenders should ascertain the LGD boundaries under which the bank operates, 
to drive lending policies. 
Parts of this chapter are published in the paper titled “Stress-testing the return on lending 
under real extreme adverse circumstances” which was presented at the EFMA Annual 
Meetings 2015. Taking in consideration the comments received, the paper was submitted 
with minor changes to the Journal of Credit Risk, with the title “Stress-testing the return on 
lending in the aftermath of the Crisis under the Basel Capital Rules”, where it is under review. 
Some sections are repeated through the dissertation to make the chapters self-contained. 
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6.1. Introduction 
 
The subprime mortgage lending crisis in the U.S. came to public’s attention 
when home foreclosures begun to rise in 2006 and moved out of control in 
2007. A large decline in home prices prompted a devaluation housing-related 
securities and an unprecedented rise in mortgage delinquencies. Worldwide, 
banks' liquidity has plummeted with a significant disruption of the financing 
of businesses and consumers. This brought dramatic changes to financial 
regulation and banking supervision, including in the area of mortgages and 
consumer credit. Simultaneously, consumer financial protection regulation 
has been strengthened and expanded, and consumer financial behaviour has 
been changing so far.  
Our study develops an empirical risk measure that relies heavily on the 
historical experience of delinquencies in this evolving landscape. In so doing, 
we contribute to enhanced knowledge in the area of credit risk assessment, 
which is relevant for setting regulatory and lending policies. We are focused 
on the study of the disturbances that affect the return on lending in real-world 
environments. The research question is if lending to the borrowers with the 
lower scores at the time of the loan application always produces negative 
returns in the long-run. 
 
6.1.1. Stress-testing the return on lending under the Basel capital rules 
 
Since 21 March 2013, Freddie Mac is making available loan-level credit 
performance data on a portion of fully amortized 30-year fixed-rate mortgages 
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that the company purchased or guaranteed since 1999. The data is provided in 
a “living” dataset and by June 2014, the database covered over 16.7 million 
of fully amortized, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S., originated 
between 1999 and the first quarter of 2013. Based on the historical observed 
delinquencies, we employ stress-testing as an attempt to project the returns 
under realistic extreme adverse economic scenarios. Returns are modelled 
under the current Basel capital rules, and so, the impact analysis is made 
considering two settings – applying the risk-weights as defined by the Basel 
Committee, and considering the parameters of the Final Rule under the Basel 
III for the U.S. banking. We stand on some basic ideas of  Saunders and Allen 
(2010) and on the model of Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008), adapting the 
formulation of the model to our problem. We formulate the Basel Capital 
Requirements based on the work of Antão and Lacerda (2011), and in the 
Basel Committee regulation under Basel II and Basel III Accords (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2006, Bank for International Settlements, 2010). 
 
6.1.2. Credit scoring – a central input in today’s lending 
 
6.1.2.1. Automated decision-making 
 
Under the Basel capital rules, banks tailor their strategies to suitably 
remunerate their shareholders. In tailoring their activity strategies, 
commercial banks have two important decisions: selecting the borrowers’ 
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desired risk profile, and positioning the pricing strategy, subjected to the 
market competitors and to regulatory boundaries.  
When selecting the borrower’s desired risk profile, lenders determine if the 
risk of lending to a borrower is acceptable under certain parameters of credit 
risk, borrower’s credit capacity and collateral evaluation.  
In retail lending, a great proportion of the loan applications are automatically 
evaluated. In this setting, credit score is the central, if not unique, indicator of 
the borrowers’ credit risk, either when the credit decision assessment is fully 
automatic or when it is an input for human decision. A person without a credit 
score or with a low score (meaning high risk) is unlikely to have credit, whilst 
an application of a person with a high score has good chances to be accepted. 
An analysis on the causes and effects of the mortgage meltdown states that in 
2007, 40% of all subprime loans have been generated by automatic 
underwritings in the U.S. This has been associated to lax controls in the 
underwriting processes (Bianco, 2008). Automated processes meant fasters 
decision, but less documentation scrutiny.  
 
6.1.2.2. Risk-based pricing 
 
Banks increasingly use risk-based pricing models to price loans when 
positioning their pricing strategies, which are also moving towards credit 
score’s over-dependence. In the U.S., since its introduction 20 years ago, 
FICO score is calculated from the information available in the individuals’ 
credit bureau reports, and has become an industry standard. It is claimed to be 
used in 90% of lending decisions, to determine how much money each 
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individual can borrow, and how much interest he will pay. As a result of the 
industry standards, the performance of credit loans depends on the credit 
scoring models accuracy, both in the short-term as in the long-run predictions. 
In 2007 and 2008, the delinquency rate in the mortgage loans in the U.S. rose 
sharply, both in borrowers in the lower scores as in the highest scores bands, 
showing that the actual risk of these borrowers has been underestimated.    
 
6.1.3. The Freddie Mac’s database – preliminary findings  
 
Anderson, Scott, and Janet Jozwik (2014) proposed a framework for 
developing a credit model based on the Freddie Mac’s dataset. For a 180-days 
delinquent target event, the authors conclude that much of the variation in 
credit performance across loans and over different stages of the economic 
cycle is explained by loan-level variables. Unsurprisingly, by adding factors 
to capture broader macroeconomic effects and the quality of underwriting, 
they significantly improve the model. Goodman, Landy, Ashworth and Yang  
(2014) present an exploratory paper providing a first look through the data, to 
find potential implications for guarantee pricing. The authors show the 
vintage composition as a percentage of the initial balance in a cross-analysis 
of the original borrowers’ FICO score by the original loan to value (LTV). 
They follow the cumulative default in three groups in the score ranges 300 to 
700, 700 to 750 and 750 to 850 crossed by the original LTV in selected 
buckets. The authors conclude that default rates are dramatically higher on 
higher LTV/lower scores, and so, they suggest that investors should look not 
only at the average LTV and FICO scores, but also at the FICO/LTV loans’ 
distribution. The authors conjecture that pricing these portfolios by looking at 
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averages should have led to under-priced default risk, but they do not present 
evidence. Sousa, Gama and Brandão (2015a) investigate the same database 
and find evidence that the first year cumulative default of the borrowers with 
score 650 or higher has almost tripled in first years of the last global crisis, 
suggesting that credit risk may has been under-priced in these cases. They 
show that default rates increased sharply during the crisis, but it did not 
increase uniformly along the range of borrowers’ credit scores. They also 
show that, two years after the crash, lending decision threshold moved 
markedly to borrowers with scores higher than 625, which led to an increase 
in concentration of lending in the individuals in the highest score bands. 
Although this is a reasonable prudential measure, excessive lending bias and 
concentration towards the highest scores require more precise default 
estimation to correctly price credit risk.  
 
6.1.4. Contributions of this study 
 
Discussion is being pushed towards risk-based pricing designs under the 
current capital rules. Previous studies (Anderson and Jozwik, 2014, Goodman 
et al., 2014, Sousa et al., 2015a) suggest that risk-based pricing models used 
within today’s lending are highly dependent on credit scores, which in turn 
are increasingly ruled under the Basel capital regulation. Behn, Haselmann 
and Wachtel (2015) use a quasi-experimental research design to examine the 
effect of model-based capital regulation on the pro-cyclicality of bank lending 
and firms' access to funds.  
Complementing the previous works, we focus on the performance of returns 
in different arrangements of borrowers’ credit risks, through contrasting 
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phases of the economic and business cycles, including the years of 
exacerbated financial distress of the last global crisis.  
This chapter follows in section 6.2 with a description of the return on risk-
adjusted equity model that is used in our study. We describe the regulatory 
environment, under the current capital regulation, and the base concepts that 
rule the model. In section 6.3, we describe the conditions of our empirical 
study. Firstly, we make an overview of the database used in our experimental 
study. Secondly, we provide a descriptive analysis regarding the interest rates 
setting, and about the lending evolution over the analysed period. Finally, we 
describe the main assumptions of the stress-testing exercise of this research. 
Section 6.4 provides the results for nine tested scenarios. We depict a 
pessimistic scenario that has been drawn from the real historical default rates 
of mortgage loans in the U.S. during the global crisis. Conclusions are 
presented in section 6.5. 
 
6.2. Return on risk-adjusted equity model 
 
Our model assumes a commercial bank that operates in the primary market, 
raising deposits from the clients and extending credit to the public. It also 
operates in the secondary market, where it transacts with other commercial 
banks, with the central bank, and in the financial markets. The bank holds 
regulatory capital as defined under the internal ratings-based (IRB) issued in 
Basel II as a cushion against unexpected losses. We assume that the bank uses 
a risk-based pricing (RBP) model to price loans. The objective function is to 
maximize the expected profit as a function of credit risk, based on the decision 
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variable, customer score, 𝑠(𝐱), which translate the probability of the customer 
entering in default in the loan after the credit has been granted. 
 
6.2.1. Regulatory environment and base concepts 
 
6.2.1.1. Regulatory capital for credit risk – IRB setting 
 
The Basel II Accord, established in 2004 and revised in 2006, attempted to 
implement more risk-sensitive credit exposure measures into capital 
requirements (Bank for International Settlements, 2006). Banks4 were 
allowed to choose the way of determining the requirements of minimum 
capital, by selecting the methodology of calculating the risk-weighted 
approach. The Standardized approach is based on external credit risk 
assessments, while in the IRB, financial institutions use their internal credit 
risk models’ system to determine the credit risk of each activity, such as 
commercial or consumer lending.  
 
6.2.1.2. Regulatory capital for credit risk – impact in lending pricing 
 
There has been a great deal of talk about Basel II leading to greater risk-based 
pricing in loan markets, because the new rules for the risk-weighted assets 
amplified the difference between capital required for risky and safe lending 
                                                          
4 Through this chapter the term “bank” is used to mean bank, banking group or other entity 
(e.g. holding company) whose capital is measured under the Basel Accord. 
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categories and borrowers. Lenders using the IRB, the Advanced banks, have 
a much lower cost of funding when lending safer types of debt or when 
lending to safer borrowers. This should have pushed lending away from 
riskier types of debt, and shorten the prices to safer categories such as low 
LTV mortgages.  
The impact of the new rules on borrowers is hard to discern, because it is not 
certain that banks had the right incentives to affect the prices by the 
differences in the cost of capital according to the type of debt or risk of the 
borrower. In fact, many lenders were already using risk-based pricing, 
especially for higher risk lending such as subprime mortgages and consumer 
loans, to compensate the exposures’ expected losses. In the one extreme, 
banks may not be motivated to reduce prices where the cost of funding got 
lower, in particular to safer borrowers, because their return on equity goes 
higher. In the other extreme, banks may have not been able to reflect the 
higher cost of funding to higher risks loans. The first reason is because many 
jurisdictions have issued consumers’ protection laws that impose a maximum 
cap in the loans’ rate. The second reason is because, worldwide, Advanced 
banks are playing in markets where there are competitors using the 
Standardized approach, which use a lower risk-weights constant parameter in 
the highest risk borrowers.  
 
6.2.1.3. Minimum capital requirements 
 
In the aftermath of the global crisis, the Basel III capital framework that was 
agreed upon internationally in December 2010, and revised in June 2011, 
established the new minimum risk-based capital ratios to be adopted 
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worldwide (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). The international 
package includes a new 4.5% common equity Tier I capital requirement, a 
6% Tier I capital requirement, and retained the general requirement for banks 
to hold a minimum total capital, or regulatory capital, of 8% of their total risk-
weighted assets (RWA), i.e.: 
 Eligible regulatory capital
Total RWA
≥ 8% ∙ 
(1)   
In addition to the minimum capital ratios, banks are required to maintain a 
capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets to avoid 
restrictions on their ability to distribute capital and to pay some discretionary 
bonuses payments to executive officers. Hence, the minimum capital ratios 
effectively increased to 7%, 8.5%, and 10.5%, respectively. Banks falling 
within the buffer will be required to limit dividends, share repurchases or 
redemptions, and discretionary bonuses. For banks using the IRB, the capital 
buffer may be increased during periods of extensive credit growth by an 
incremental countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% of the risk-weighted 
assets.  
Currently, for the exposures not in default, financial institutions using the IRB 
compute the total RWA by multiplying the capital requirements for market 
risk, 𝐶𝑅𝑀, and operational risk, 𝐶𝑅𝑂, by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the 
minimum capital ratio of 8%) and adding the resulting figures to the sum of 
risk-weighted assets for credit risk. Then a scaling factor of 1.06 is applied to 
the risk weighted assets for credit risk aiming to broadly maintain the 
aggregate level of minimum capital requirements (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2006).  
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 Total RWA = 12.5(1.06 × 𝐾 × 𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝐶𝑅𝑀 +  𝐶𝑅𝑂) (2)  
where K is the capital requirement for the credit risk asset amounts, whose 
formula is disclosed within the Basel II official documents (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2006), and EAD is the exposure at default. 
According to a recent report of the European Banking Authority (EBA, 
2013a) the RWA component related to credit risk for the aggregate of the 
European banks operating under the IRB represents about 77% of the total 
RWA.  
The derivation of risk-weighted assets depends on the estimates of the PD5, 
LGD, EAD and, in some cases, effective maturity (M), for a given exposure. 
The PD is a measure of the borrower’s risk, the loss given default, LGD, is the 
expected proportion of the exposure that the financial institution will recover 
conditional to the borrower entering in default. The formulas for computing 
the K parameter vary according to the risk category of the assets, whether the 
exposure at risk belongs to one of the macro-segments: corporate, sovereign, 
banks and retail. Corporate segment includes the exposures of all enterprises, 
excepting the non-financial enterprises of small and medium size, SME, with 
exposures bellow 1 million Euros. Enterprises excluded from the corporate 
segment are considered in retail. In the retail segment, the risk weights are 
differentiated by the type of credit, whether it is in the category of residential 
exposure, a qualifying revolving credit line, or other retail exposure. 
  
                                                          
5The Basel Accords official documents typically use the abbreviation PD to denote the 
probability of a borrower entering in default, which is equivalent to the notation p(B), 
probability of a borrower being bad, used in chapter 2. In the current chapter we will use the 
abbreviation PD to be consistent with the Basel terminology. 
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6.2.1.4. Exposure at default 
 
Our model considers a loan with the original conditions, at the time of the 
application: amount 𝐴, annual interest rate 𝑅, term of 𝑛 years and regular 
monthly payments. These assumptions determine the number of payments, 
𝑁 = 12𝑛, the monthly interest rate, 𝑟 = 𝑅 12⁄ , and installment amount: 
 
𝑀 =
𝑟𝐴
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑁
 
(3)  
A basic assumption is that the monthly instalment consists of the sum of two 
parts. One part consists of the interests’ amount to be paid in the month and 
the other is the repayment of the initial amount granted, such that in the month 
i, i=1.. N, these two parts are computed as follows: 
 Repayment of amount granted (𝑃𝑖): 
 𝑃𝑖 = (𝑀 − 𝑟𝐴)(1 + 𝑟)
𝑖−1 (4)  
 Interests’ amount to be paid (𝐼𝑖): 
 𝐼𝑖 = 𝑀 − 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑟𝐶𝑖−1 (5)  
where 𝐶𝑖−1 is the exposure at default in the end of the month 𝑖 − 1  and in the 
beginning of the month 𝑖, i.e. the amount after amortization, which is 
computed as: 
𝐶𝑖−1 = 𝐴 − (𝑀 − 𝑟𝐴) ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
𝑘−1𝑖−1
𝑘=1
              
 and 𝐶0 = 𝐴. (6)  
Equivalent to  
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𝐶𝑖−1 = 𝐴 − (𝑀 − 𝑟𝐴) (
1−(1+𝑟)𝑖−1
𝑟
)
              
 and 𝐶0 = 𝐴. (7)  
Here we assume that until the default event, the borrower entirely pays the 
instalments according to the debt service plan. For simplicity, in the current 
setting of model we do not distinguish the early repayments, which also 
impact on the expected returns. Therefore, the exposure at default in the 
month 𝑖, i=1..N, for a borrower that did not reach the default event is: 
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖−1. (8)  
 
6.2.1.5. Cost of funding 
 
An asset of amount 𝐴 is funded by equity, 𝐸, and debt, D, such that: 
 𝐴 = 𝐸 + 𝐷. (9)  
The equity needed to fund the asset, related to credit risk, can be assumed as: 
               E = 𝑠𝑟 × 𝑟𝑤 × A, (10)  
where 𝑟𝑤 is the risk-weight factor for credit risk, and 𝑠𝑟 is the solvability 
ratio targeted by the bank, which needs to be at least 8% - the minimum 
capital ratio. The 𝑟𝑤 parameter is defined by the Basel Committee, both for 
the Advanced and for the Standardized approach, and may be adjusted by 
local bank regulatory agencies, as it happens in the U.S. and in the E.U. 
Examples of local conventions include the Final Rule issued by the U.S. bank 
regulatory agencies that set comprehensive regulatory capital framework for 
the U.S. banking organizations under the Basel III and implements the 
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capital-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. In the E.U., Basel Accords 
have been introduced via the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). This 
Directive provides a common framework for implementation, but allows for 
national discretions. One example of a national discretion is the LTV limit for 
qualifying residential mortgages with the preferential risk weighting of 35%. 
In the UK, for example, this limit has been set at 80% by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). For a bank using the IRB approach without any 
changes rw is 12.5 × 1.06 × K. 
Equation (9) can be rewritten as: 
 𝐴 = 𝑠𝑟 × 𝑟𝑤𝐴 + (1 − 𝑠𝑟 × 𝑟𝑤)𝐴 (11)  
The cost of equity, 𝐶𝐸, can be evaluated according to the return required by 
the shareholders, for which we assume the profitability measure return on 
equity, 𝑟𝐸. 
 𝐶𝐸 = 𝑟𝐸𝐸. (12)  
Equity is the costliest way of financing. So, financial institutions using the 
IRB benefit from lower costs of funding when lending to entities of better 
risks, i.e. lower PD and lower LGD. In the other extreme their cost of 
funding is higher when lending to entities of worst risks, i.e. higher PD and 
higher LGD. This can easily be recognised from the monotonic behaviour 
of the 𝑟𝑤 factor when varying these two parameters, which we illustrate 
with an example in Fig 6.1. 
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Fig. 6.1: Illustrative IRB risk-weights for residential retail. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2006). 
 
On the other side, the cost of debt, 𝐶𝐷, is 
 𝐶𝐷 = 𝑟𝐷𝐷, (13)  
where 𝑟𝐷 is the price of debt, considering the structure of financing and price 
that the bank can get in wholesale funding (central banks and markets) and 
from clients’ deposits. 
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6.2.1.6. Expected loss 
 
Our model assumes that when a borrower enters in default then from that 
point onwards he will not leave the default status. If the 𝑃𝐷𝑖, i=1.. N, is the 
probability of the borrower entering in default in the month 𝑖 and the LGD is 
the loss given default conditioned on the default event, then the expected loss 
for that borrower in that month, 𝐸𝐿𝑖, is 
𝐸𝐿𝑖 = 𝑃𝐷𝑖 × 𝐿𝐺𝐷 × 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 (14)  
The cumulative default until the end of the loan is equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of default in each year, as illustrated in Fig. 6.2. 
 
Fig. 6.2: Illustrative example of a cumulative default. 
 
In the remainder of the chapter, we will assume that both the PD and the LGD 
parameters are available for each borrower at the time of the underwriting.  
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6.2.2. The model 
 
The starting point for achieving the return expected for the loan is the 
equality: 
 Profits = Costs (15)  
For the costs associated with the loan, we consider the cost of funding and the 
losses associated with credit default events, the expected loss (EL). Other 
costs, such as administrative or infrastructure costs, are not considered in this 
model, despite of being relevant for the banks’ activity based costing.  
 Costs=𝐶𝐸 + 𝐶𝐷 + 𝐸𝐿 (16)  
Profits include the fees and the interests charged on the loan. We assume that 
the interest rate consists of a market reference rate, rr, plus a spread, 𝑠𝑝. The 
spread component is intended to cover a profit margin and the risks associated 
with the loan, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk, 
and other risks as may be identified by the bank from time to time. 
Traditionally, fees, 𝑓, can be either ad valorem or bullet. The former is 
equivalent to using a spread. The latter can be converted into a spread prior 
to the calculation of profits, based on the maturity of the loan and the 
frequency of payments.  
 Profits=(𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝)𝐴 + 𝑓 (17)  
Considering the equalities in (16) and (17), equation (15) is rewritten as: 
 (𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝)𝐴 + 𝑓 = 𝐶𝐸 + 𝐶𝐷 + 𝐸𝐿 (18)  
 128 
 
equivalent to: 
 (𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝)𝐴 + 𝑓 =  𝑟𝐸𝐸 + 𝑟𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸𝐿 (19)  
Isolating the components of spread intended to cover the credit and liquidity 
risks, applied to the total amount to be financed, the previous equation is 
rewritten as: 
 (𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝𝑐 + 𝑠𝑝𝑙 + 𝑠𝑝𝑜)𝐴 + 𝑓 =  𝑟𝐸𝐸 + 𝑟𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸𝐿 (20)  
where, 𝑠𝑝𝑐 is the credit risk spread, 𝑠𝑝𝑙 is the liquidity spread, and 𝑠𝑝𝑜 is the 
spread that covers the profit margin and remaining risks, like operational or 
country risk.  
 
6.2.2.1. Credit risk spread 
 
Equation (20) can be rewritten as: 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝐴 =  𝑟𝐸𝐸 + 𝑟𝐷(𝐴 − 𝐸) + 𝐸𝐿 − (𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝𝑙 + 𝑠𝑝𝑜)𝐴 − 𝑓 (21)  
Rearranging the arguments and isolating the credit risk spread, this is 
equivalent to: 
𝑠𝑝𝑐 =  
𝐸
𝐴
(𝑟𝐸 − 𝑟𝐷) + (𝑟𝐷 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑝𝑙 − 𝑠𝑝𝑜) +
𝐸𝐿 − 𝑓
𝐴
 
(22)  
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Considering the equality in (10), then the credit spread that allows an 
adequate return on equity6 is: 
 𝑠𝑝𝑐 =  𝑠𝑟 × 𝑟𝑤(𝑟𝐸 − 𝑟𝐷) + (𝑟𝐷 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑝𝑙 − 𝑠𝑝𝑜) +
𝐸𝐿 − 𝑓
𝐴
 (23)  
If the bank funds the debt by the market reference rate, i.e. 𝑟𝐷 = 𝑟𝑟, then the 
credit risk spread is: 
 
𝑠𝑝𝑐 =  𝑠𝑟. 𝑟𝑤. (𝑟𝐸 − 𝑟𝑟) − (𝑠𝑝𝑙 + 𝑠𝑝𝑜) +
𝐸𝐿 − 𝑓
𝐴
 
(24)  
 
6.2.2.2. Return on equity of a loan 
 
Rearranging the arguments in equation (20), and isolating 𝑟𝐸, then the return 
on equity rate needed to fund the loan is: 
𝑟𝐸 =
1
𝐸
(𝑠𝑝𝑐𝐴 − 𝐸𝐿) −  
𝐴
𝐸
(𝑟𝐷 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑝𝑙 − 𝑠𝑝𝑜) + 𝑟𝐷 +
𝑓
𝐸
 (25)  
Or, stated equivalently:  
𝑟𝐸 =
1
𝑠𝑟. 𝑟𝑤
[(𝑠𝑝𝑐 − 𝑟𝐷 + 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑝𝑙 + 𝑠𝑝𝑜) −
𝐸𝐿 − 𝑓
𝐴
] + 𝑟𝐷 
(26)  
Likewise, if the bank funds the debt by the market reference rate, i.e. 𝑟𝐷 = 𝑟𝑟, 
then the return needed to fund a loan is 
 𝑟𝐸 =
1
𝑠𝑟.𝑟𝑤
[(𝑠𝑝𝑐 + 𝑠𝑝𝑙 + 𝑠𝑝𝑜) −
𝐸𝐿−𝑓
𝐴
] + 𝑟𝑟. 
(27)  
                                                          
6 Here we consider the return before taxes. 
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6.3. Empirical study 
 
6.3.1. Data 
 
The empirical study summarized in this chapter is based on the Freddie Mac’s 
single family mortgage loan-level dataset, first published in March 2013. We 
have followed the performance of 16.7 million of fully amortized 30-year 
fixed-rate mortgages loans in the U.S., granted between January 1st 1999 and 
March 31st 2013. Loans performance has been measured in a monthly basis 
and, at the time of this research, data for performing loans and those that were 
up to 180 days delinquent were available through September 30th 2013. The 
dataset is updated over time, typically at the end of each quarter. Release 
changes, as well as a general user guide describing the file layout and data 
dictionary,  are recorded online (Freddie Mac, June 2014a). Freddie Mac’s 
information regarding the key loan attributes and performance metrics can be 
linked to this research in the aggregated summary statistics (Freddie Mac, 
June 2014b).  
Data of the original datasets were aggregated by the origination year. Scores 
may vary in the range 300-850, or be unknown. Situations where the score is 
unknown are described by Freddie Mac’s Corporation (June 2013b), who 
refers that these may be an outcome of the sellers’ reduced level of 
verification. We divided the range of possible scores into equidistant intervals 
of 25, except for the lower and upper bounds. To have dimension, these 
bounds were aggregated in the buckets [300, 550[ and [800, 850[, 
respectively. 
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6.3.2. Interest rates setting 
 
Mortgage interest rates are affected by many factors. In the United States they 
are heavily influenced by the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Trends in interest rates 
on longer financial instruments, such as mortgages, typically follow the 
fluctuation of the 10-year Treasury note yield. Fig. 6.3 shows the evolution of 
the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate over the period 2005 through 
2012, and the 10-year constant maturity advance rates authorized by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) for the advance pricing.  
 
Fig. 6.3: Case study U.S. - Rates evolution in the period 1999-2012.  
Sources: Freddie Mac’s single-family loan level dataset, FHFA historical advance rates and 
FED 10-year Treasury note yield.  
 
These rates serve as a reference for the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage loans. 
Their evolution is represented in Fig. 6.3, together with the average rate, the 
prime rate and the subprime rate. Borrowers’ scores are used to differentiate 
the interest rates of the mortgages, with the subprime rates being superior to 
the prime rates. In the period under analysis, the average rates are shifted to 
the prime rates (in Fig. 6.3. these lines are overlapped), because lending tends 
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to be more driven to borrowers with the highest scores. The gap between the 
subprime and the prime rates slightly increased in the aftermath of the crisis, 
between 2008 and 2011, as illustrated in Fig. 6.4. 
 
Fig. 6.4: Case study U.S. - Gap subprime - prime rate, 1999-2012. 
Source: Freddie Mac single-family loan level dataset. 
 
Between 2004 and 2007, spreads placed around 170 bps for the prime loans 
and in the average portfolio, and around 190 bps for the subprime loans (Fig. 
6.5). Spreads increased in the aftermath of the crisis, and reached a peak in 
2008 (Fig. 6.5). A recent report of the Federal Housing Finance Agency says 
that a 170 bps spread is expected from 2015 through 2017 (Schultz, August 
2014) to cover liquidity and credit risks. 
 
Fig. 6.5: Case study U.S. - 30-year mortgage spreads in the period 1999-2012. 
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6.3.3. Stress testing scenarios  
 
6.3.3.1. Expect margin and expected losses assumptions 
 
We have analysed the performance of the returns in each year after the loan 
has been underwritten. Losses have been empirically assessed based on the 
past observed default rates in each score bucket. Rather than just using the 
average default in the period, as traditional approaches often do, we have 
focused on the two possible extreme circumstances – an optimistic scenario 
and a pessimistic scenario. The optimistic scenario is ruled by the cumulative 
default rates by vintage of an origination year with a lower 1-year default rate 
(1999). The pessimistic scenario is ruled by the cumulative default rates by 
vintage of the origination year with the highest 1-year default rate (2008). We 
have also analysed an average scenario, as a reference, which is ruled on the 
weighted average annual cumulative default rates in the period 1999-2008. 
Default rates measured after 2008 were not considered in this analysis 
because the vintage curves could not be measured from the fifth year onwards 
(e.g. for the loans underwritten in 2009, only a 4-years vintage can be 
measured until 2013, and for the loans underwritten in 2012, only a 1-year 
vintage can be measured until 2013). For the purpose of this study, a borrower 
is considered to have entered in default after completing 90 consecutive days 
in delinquency. The vintage curves presented in a previous study of Landy, 
Ashworth and Yang (2014) suggest that the default rate by vintage have a 
plateau from the fifth year onwards. Hence, for this analysis we assume the 
measures of default rates in the first five years of the loan will reveal most of 
the expected default of the portfolio. The real default rates were measured 
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from the single-family mortgages loan level dataset in each year between 
1999 and 2008. 
For the three scenarios of default evolution under hypothesis - the average, 
the optimistic and the pessimistic - we study the performance of the returns 
along time based on the three corresponding representations of expected 
losses. Hence, we analyse the performance of the returns under nine potential 
circumstances, thoroughly illustrated in Fig. 6.6. For simplicity, only the 
cumulative default curves in the average portfolio and in two distant score 
buckets are represented – the low score is in the range [600; 625[, and high 
score is in the range [800; 850[. The three representations of expected losses 
are:  
 Conjectural model: assumes that the proportion of new defaults in 
each year remains constant along the expected life of the asset. In 
other words, if PD is the probability of default one year after the loan 
has been granted then the probability of new defaults in the year i is 
(1 − 𝑃𝐷)𝑖−1PD.  
 Semi-conjectural model: The evolution of new defaults is given by the 
conjectural model until the fifth year, and the model assumes that from 
that point onwards there are no new defaults. 
 Observed model: assumes the observed proportion of new default 
until the fifth year of the loan and that from that point onwards there 
are no new defaults. 
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Fig. 6.6. Case study U.S. - Cumulative default rates used in each scenario.  
Three scenarios of expected losses were used - average, optimistic and pessimistic – and using three models to represent the cumulative default rate evolution – 
conjectural, semi-conjectural and observed. The low score is in the range [600; 625[, and high score is in the range [800; 850[. The average is the weighted average 
cumulative default rate of the portfolio.
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We measure the expect returns along time, after the loan has been originated, 
using the methodology described in section 6.2.1. The calculation of the 
expected losses has assumed the PD implied in each of the nine scenarios 
under hypothesis (Fig. 6.6) and retaining the two LDG values behind the 
Basel Committee’s illustrative IRB risk weights1, 25% and 45% published by 
the Bank for International Settlements (2006). To calculate the expected 
margin we considered the average advance rates in the origination year, which 
are published online by the Federal Home Loan Bank (Federal Home Loan 
Bank, 2014). 
 
6.3.3.2. Risk-weights parameter assumptions 
 
Under the Basel III capital requirements, countries may define specific rules 
for the risk-weight parameters.  
Many banks using the IRB in the European Union (EU) calculate the risk 
weights for mortgage loans based on the formula provided by the Basel 
Committee for the residential retail risk category. And so, the risk weight 
attached to these mortgages largely depends on the lender’s historical default 
losses experience, subject to cyclical phases’ (e.g. downturn) assumptions, 
which drives the internal risk models. For realistic values of PD and LDG this 
can give rise to risk weights on this risk category well below 35%. 
In the U.S. the Final Rule approved on July 2nd 2013, by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System brought the U.S. banks into 
                                                          
1 Annex 5, page 279. 
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compliance with the Basel III capital framework agreed in December 2010. 
For the banks using the advanced approach in computing risk-based 
regulatory capital, the final rule took effect in January 1st 2014. For the 
majority of the U.S. banks operating under the standardized approach, the 
Final Rule took effect on January 1st 2015. The Final Rule established the 
standardized approach and the advanced approach to calculate risk-weighted 
assets in the U.S. However, for Advanced Banks, the standardized approach 
is considered to establish the minimum generally applicable capital floor 
requirements for purposes of the section 171 of Dodd-Frank - the Collins 
Amendment. The Final Rule retained the 50% risk-weight for the residential 
mortgage loans secured by a first lien on a one-to-four family residential 
owner-occupied or rented property. This rule does not apply to the loans 
imprudently underwritten, that are 90 days or more past due or in accrual 
status, or modified or restructured loans, other than pursuant to the Home 
Affordable Modification Program. 
In this research we aimed at representing the most relevant risk-weights 
parameters. Hence, to assess the expect returns, we considered two risk-
weighting approaches: 
 A fixed 50% risk-weight, as used within the U.S. banks for the 
residential mortgage loans secured by a first lien on a one-to-four 
family residential owner-occupied or rented property. 
 The risk-weights parameters computed with the Basel Committee 
formula for the residential retail risk category, 12.5 × 1.06 × K, 
used within many Advanced banks in the European Union. 
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6.4. Results 
 
Returns are shown for each hypothesized scenario and applying the risk-based 
model in equation (27). This section we exhibit a set of figures illustrating the 
returns along the life of the assets, since the loans have been originated until 
maturity. In each graph, the bottom curves represent the returns in the lower 
score buckets, beginning in the score 300. Returns’ curves move progressively 
along the score buckets in the direction of the upper curve, which represents 
the returns in the higher scores bucket [800; 850[. The returns of the 
aggregated portfolio of loans underwritten in the same year are represented in 
the bold line in each graph – the average return. Any random pooling of loans 
of the aggregated portfolio, which have been originated in the same year, 
should produce the average return. Any portfolio of loans, originated in the 
same year, in selected ranges of scores should produce a weighted average 
return of those score ranges. Some combinations of loans with different 
origination years may produce negative returns. This may occur when the 
resulting portfolio has a significant proportion of loans that did not reach the 
break-even point or if it has a significant proportion of loans in specific score 
ranges that coexist with negative returns in a given point in time. 
Our study shows the extent to which return on equity to finance loans largely 
depends on the rule for calculating the risk-weighted assets. When banks use 
a constant risk-weight factor, like in the U.S., returns are upper-bounded 
(meaning that returns cannot be higher than a certain value). Banks calculating 
the risk-weights under the IRB as defined by the Basel Committee, and 
operating in markets where the competitors use the standard approach, may 
have little incentive to decrease prices to customers with the highest scores, 
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by placing their prices in the market prices. If this happens, these banks will 
certainly reach higher return rates when lending to these segments. 
It is now recognised that credit losses arising from credit defaults were far 
superior than anticipated during the subprime crisis. This was an outcome of 
an unprecedented decline in home prices that led to a devaluation housing-
related securities and rise in foreclosures, together with a sudden escalation 
of the delinquency rates. The estimation of the LGD parameter depends 
mostly on the banks’ ability in recovering and collecting defaulted loans. 
Banks in the advanced economies have their own LGD estimates. Banks may 
use assessment methods ranging from simple LGD estimates at an aggregated 
level to more sophisticated models, as under the IRB. This information is 
usually not public, therefore, in this study we have analysed the returns under 
two standard LGD values of the Basel Committee - 25% and 45% (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2006). To the extent of our knowledge, for the 
residential retail exposures, the LGD should be closer to the 25% reference 
value in average conditions. But this value is expected to rise in times of 
recession, when banks are swamped with defaulted loans and high provisions. 
Hence, the 45% LGD reference should better allow replicating the conditions 
of a catastrophic situation.  
For values of LGD up to 25%, most of the credit score buckets produce 
positive returns along the entire life of the asset, either in average conditions 
or in adverse circumstances. Few exceptions are remarked in the very lowest 
scores ranges, the subprime loans, between score 300 and score 625, where 
the returns turn negative somewhere between the second and the fourth year 
after the loan has been originated, if the loan is originated under the most 
adverse scenario. These findings are confirmed in the graphs of the pessimist 
scenario in Fig 6.7 and Fig 6.8, and more markedly in the observed default 
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model (graphs (i)). However, returns turn positive from the fifth year onwards 
either if we assume that the cumulative defaults reach a plateau by the fifth 
year (Fig 6.7 (f), Fig 6.7 (i), Fig 6.8 (f) and Fig 6.8 (i)) or if we consider that 
the new default evolves constantly over time until loan maturity (Fig 6.7 (c) 
and Fig 6.8 (c)). A portfolio of loans randomly selected from the aggregated 
portfolio, originated in the same year, generates positive returns along the 
entire life of the assets (see the bold curve is the graphs of all scenarios in Fig 
6.7 and Fig 6.8). 
Placing the LGD in 45% suggests a discussion from a very different 
perspective. A higher LGD amplifies the disturbances stimulated by the 
increase in default rate, and so, under this setting, a significant number of loan 
pooling arrangements can generate negative returns. This is valid throughout 
the cycle, in average conditions, but is more applicable to extreme adverse 
circumstances, because an LGD of 45% is more likely to occur during times 
of serious financial distress. Hence, we centre our discussion in the results for 
the pessimistic scenario. In this setting, a portfolio of loans randomly selected, 
originated in the same year, should produce a weighted average return, 
represented in the bold curves in Fig 6.9 and Fig 6.10, which even under the 
pessimistic scenario are able to produce positive returns. However, in the 
years of sharp increase in default rates, returns are negative, which may occur 
somewhere between the third (Fig 6.9 (i) and Fig 6.10 (i)) and the fifth year 
(Fig 6.9 (c), Fig 6.9 (f), Fig 6.9 (c) and Fig 6.10 (f)). When isolating the returns 
in each score bucket, a wide range of scores has negative returns in the first 
years of the loan. In particular, up to the score 675, returns are below the 
average. In the score range [300; 575[ returns are negative between the 
origination point and the fifth year. In the score range [575; 675[ returns are 
negative between the first and sixth year, depending in the scenario of default 
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evolution (conjectural, semi-conjectural or observed). When the new defaults 
evolve as defined under the conjectural default model, i.e. assuming that the 
new defaults evolve constantly over time, then the best scored loans also reach 
negative returns is some point in time, until the tenth year of the loans (Fig 
6.9 (c) and Fig 6.10 (c)). This is more noticeable when using the risk-weights 
calculated with the Basel Committee formula (Fig 6.10 (c)). Under this 
setting, the loans with the highest scored borrowers may produce highly 
negative returns around the tenth year. 
Following the subprime crisis, lenders are firmly declining the subprime 
loans, below the score 620, as described in a paper of Keys et al (2008). In 
fact, the risk of these loans is higher than in other scores, as previously stated. 
However, when these loans go older, mostly after the fifth year, the expected 
returns increase. 
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Fig. 6.7. Case study U.S. - Expected returns, rw=50% and LGD=25%.  
From down to the top of the image, lines represent the expected returns in the score buckets [300; 550[, [550; 575[,[575; 600[, [600; 625[,[625; 650[, [650; 675[,[675; 
700[, [700; 725[, [725; 750[, [750; 775[,[775; 800[, [800; 850[, respectively. 
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Fig. 6.8. Case study U.S. - Expected returns, rw=12.5×1.06×K and LGD=25%.  
From down to the top of the image, lines represent the expected returns in the score buckets [300; 550[, [550; 575[,[575; 600[, [600; 625[,[625; 650[, [650; 675[,[675; 
700[, [700; 725[, [725; 750[, [750; 775[,[775; 800[, [800; 850[, respectively. 
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Fig. 6.9. Case study U.S. - Expected returns, rw=50% and LGD=45%.  
From down to the top of the image, lines represent the expected returns in the score buckets [300; 550[, [550; 575[,[575; 600[, [600; 625[,[625; 650[, [650; 675[,[675; 
700[, [700; 725[, [725; 750[, [750; 775[,[775; 800[, [800; 850[, respectively. 
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Fig. 6.10. Case study U.S. - Expected returns, rw=12.5×1.06×K and LGD=45%.  
From down to the top of the image, lines represent the expected returns in the score buckets [300; 550[, [550; 575[,[575; 600[, [600; 625[,[625; 650[, [650; 675[,[675; 
700[, [700; 725[, [725; 750[, [750; 775[,[775; 800[, [800; 850[, respectively. 
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6.5. Conclusions 
 
Regulators, academics and the financial industry increasingly recognize the 
importance of stressing their reference models under extreme circumstances. 
Stress-testing often rely on theoretical assumptions or heavily depend on 
projections (e.g. GDP growth, unemployment or the business in the following 
period), which in turn are based in several other conjectures. This approach 
may be of little value if the premises are inaccurate or if the projections 
remain valid during a short-term period. The former may lead to misleading 
conclusions; the later may turn outdated fairly quickly. If, on the one hand, 
the practical value of these exercises may be debatable, on the other, 
understanding how real systems evolve in normal conditions and during 
exacerbated circumstances is of a great use.  
We present a stress-testing exercise based in a real-world dataset of 16.7 
million loans that were at the epicentre of the global crisis, the Freddie Mac’s 
single family mortgage loan-level dataset, first published in March 2013. We 
did not attempt to draw a set of baseline assumptions for the future 
macroeconomic or business conditions. Instead, we simulated the most 
extreme circumstances of the past, which impacted severely in credit risk and 
in returns. The measure of risk uses the FICO score, which is an industry 
standard in the U.S., currently used in 90% of the lending decisions to 
determine how much money each individual can borrow and to set the interest 
rate for each loan. Hence, since its introduction 20 years ago, the latest 
financial crisis might have been the most severe disruption affecting the 
borrower’s ability to repay their debt.  
We analysed the performance of the returns over time considering nine 
potential scenarios of default rate evolution, each was replicated for an LGD 
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of 25% and LGD of 45%, and for a constant 50% risk-weight and applying 
the risk-weight formula of the Basel Committee for the IRB approach. With 
very few exceptions, for an LGD up to 25%, most of the credit score buckets 
produce positive returns along the entire life of the asset, either in average 
conditions or in adverse circumstances. Within this setting, a portfolio of 
loans randomly selected from the aggregate portfolio, originated in the same 
year, should generate positive returns. Higher LGD amplifies the disturbances 
caused by default rate increases. For a 45% LGD, a significant number of 
loan pooling arrangements can generate negative returns, either through the 
cycle, but more noticeably under extreme adverse circumstances. Under this 
setting, for a wide range of scores, up to 675, returns are below the average 
in the first years of the loans. If the new default rates evolve constantly over 
time, then the best scored loans may also reach negative returns is some point 
in time, in the first 10 years of the loans.  
Following the subprime crisis, lenders are firmly declining the subprime 
loans, below the score 620, and restricting credit to the adjacent lower score 
borrowers. Although the risk of these loans is higher than in other scores, more 
consideration should be promoted around the expected return of these loans, 
including the subprime. When these loans go older, mostly after the fifth year, 
the expected return increase, meaning that in the long run, the loans in the 
lowest scores can positively contribute to the overall return of the portfolios. 
Although we did not analyse the effect of early repayments, intuition and 
practical knowledge also suggest that these loans will probably not be paid in 
advance, and so they are valuable for the portfolios' compositions. So, current 
regulation would be improved if specific rules were developed for accurately 
pricing loans to the low scores borrowers, rather than strictly prohibiting. This 
could be complemented by imposing boundaries in the proportion of these 
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loans in the composition of the portfolios, bearing in mind that the risk 
significantly reduces when these loans go older, in contradiction to the highest 
score loans that may reach peaks of negative returns around the tenth year. In 
so doing, the target market, which now is concentrated in the prime scores 
borrowers, would expand, which is crucial in retail banking.  
 149 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
7.1. Summary and contributions 
 
The main contribution of this research is a new modelling framework for 
credit risk assessment that extends the prevailing credit scoring models built 
upon historical data static settings. We also extended a line of investigation 
consisting of a stress-testing methodology that was applied to the Freddie 
Mac’s database. 
In the core of our research, we propose an initial approach to dynamic credit 
scoring in which the credit scoring model is developed with a static modelling 
framework, and then adjusted by time-changing macroeconomic factors. 
Afterwards, we extended the previous methodology by proposing a new 
dynamic modelling framework based on a sequential learning of the new 
incoming data (Sousa et al., 2016). Within the new modelling schema, 
predictions are made upon the sequence of temporal data, which is more 
suitable for adapting to real default concept drifts, translated by changes in 
the population, in the economy or in the market. The new framework enabled 
us to depict the two basic mechanisms of memory - short-term (STM) and 
long-term memory (LTM) - in credit risk assessment, with a set of empirical 
studies using two real-world financial datasets. 
The first empirical studies used a sample of credit cards of a financial 
institution operating in Brazil from 2009 through 2011. Then, we enhanced 
the research with the Freddie Mac’s database, available since 2013, where we 
analysed 16.7 million loans in the U.S. that were at the epicentre of the global 
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crisis, granted between 1999 and 2013. Three plain assumptions are 
confirmed in our investigation: newest data consistently improves forecasting 
accuracy; STM allows a quick adaptation to changes and LTM is more 
favourable in stable conditions. In real-world environments, different 
amounts of memory can be explored concurrently. This is important in the 
credit risk area, which often undergoes shocks. During a shock, limited 
memory is important; other times a larger memory is favoured. 
In the banking industry, credit scoring models are developed from static 
windows and often kept unchanged over years. In this setting, the two basic 
mechanisms of memory, STM and LTM, which are fundamental to learning, 
are still overlooked in current modelling frameworks. As a consequence, they 
are insensitive to changes, like population drifts or financial distress. The 
usual outcomes are the default rates rising and abrupt credit cuts, as those that 
were observed in the U.S., in the aftermath of the last Global crisis (Sousa et 
al., 2015a). This is one area where new thoughts, like simplifying current 
decision layers, need to be encouraged, because regulators still promote 
models whose coefficients do not change over time. 
Finally, being aware that no rating system is fully capable of anticipating 
distressing events, we developed a research pipeline, consisting of a stress-
testing methodology that was applied to the Freddie Mac’s database. We 
study how the return on lending evolves in normal conditions and under 
extreme adverse circumstances, subject to the current capital regulations, 
under the Basel Accords. As a part of our major contributions, we settled a 
first return on a risk-adjusted equity model embedded in the contemporary 
capital regulatory framework. Then we proposed a stress-testing 
methodology where the driving factors are the default by vintage and LGD, 
an alternative to using heavy and uncertain theoretical or macroeconomic 
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assumptions. We present a first application of Freddie Mac’s data to stress-
testing, which can easily be replicated in other real-world consumer finance 
portfolios. This allowed us to explicitly exhibit the impact of PD and LGD in 
the return on lending, based on the Freddie Mac’s mortgage loans, and to 
argue that the sudden credit-cuts by score have been an overreaction to the 
last global crisis. Under certain values of LGD, empirical simulations show 
that lending to borrowers with lower scores produces positive returns in the 
long-run. If sufficiently mature, these loans can boost portfolios compositions 
because they are less exposed to early payments. We claim that regulators and 
lenders should ascertain the LGD boundaries under which the bank operates 
to drive lending policies in retail banking. 
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7.2. Limitations and research directions 
 
In the main line of investigation, there are some important topics in the default 
concept drift that we did not consider, which we have deferred for future 
research. Firstly, some specifics of the financial contexts may seem fairly 
stable along some periods. While this thesis provides convincing results, 
some additional simulations using real-world datasets and longer time frames 
would be valuable. Secondly, modelling the delinquency presents challenges, 
since a window of time is required in order to measure the outcome, that is, 
the true class, before the new model is built. Therefore, for forecasting, it 
follows that there will be a time gap of the same length between the values of 
predictor variables used in the model and the first possible forecast period in 
the future. Although this is not a problem of the proposed methodology, future 
research should bring new insights to overcome this issue, with a view on 
practicality. Thirdly, some good alternatives to using windows of data blocks 
are encouraged, which may be based on using ensembles of the models learnt 
in the past, possible combining the two components of memory, short-term 
and long-term memory, or a forgetting factor method. In relation to the STM 
component, a prior selection of the window length seems appropriate and 
could be employed to optimize the adaptation ability. There is some material 
on this going back to Adams (2010). Fourthly, our empirical study considered 
a set of fixed predictors. Future research should consider sets of predictor of 
variable length. This is important for detecting concept drift because the set 
of predictors that are being used may be quite limited to exhibit signs of 
change, even if they are occurring in the environment. Finally, performance 
is reported in this paper, but the conditions leading to differences in 
performance are not fully explored.   
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In the pipeline research, we did not address some important subjects, into 
which an in-depth investigation is encouraged.  
Firstly, the model ignores the prepayment and refinancing risks. Although our 
expectation is that, in doing so, our findings would be strengthened because 
early repayments should be shifted to higher scored borrowers. Some good 
ideas on how to introduce these risks in the model could be promoted and 
their impact in the results analysed. Some key concepts relevant for this task 
are proposed in a recent paper of Campbell and Cocco (2015).  
Secondly a key parameter in the comparative analysis is the loss given default 
(LGD). Our simulations use an LGD which is uniformly distributed across 
credit risk classes or, in other words, the LGD and the credit score are 
independent variables. Therefore, some additional modelling in the LGD 
parameter could be valuable.  
Finally, we consider the credit risk and the cost of funding evaluations at the 
time of the application: a period which may be too short considering the 
maturity of the credit. So, time-varying evaluations would improve the 
realism of these simulations. As far as we could ascertain, there is little 
research on how to solve this practical limitation. We believe that the 
methodology developed in our main line of investigation can be extended to 
address this problem. This is another direction for future research. 
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